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The Powers of Shareholders of a
Societe Anonyme
David J. Supino*
The French socidt6 anonyme is comparable, if not the equivalent of,
to the American corporation or the English company. Mr. Supino here
discusses the development of and limitations on the power of sharehwlders of a socit6 anonyme to amend articles of incorporation,remove
directors, and to perform a function not performed by shareholders of
American corporations: allocate profits. Mr. Supino concludes that
French courts are forced to "legislate interstitially" in this area in the
application of the codes, but that the need for French courts to exercise
this quasi-legislative functions should be recognized by both the courts

and commentators.

In France, as in the United States, the corporation as an important
social and economic institution is a product of the nineteenth century.
It comes as no surprise, therefore, to find that historically the bias of
French corporation law has been to regard the corporation as the
outgrowth of private agreement rather than as a creature of the
state.1 The present tendency of French law, however, is running
contrary to this historical bias. To some extent it has come to be
recognized that private agreement has, in the context of present needs,

distinct limitations both as a method of investor protection and as a
method of properly accommodating all the economic and social

interests at stake. But this recognition-or shift in values-has only
imperfectly been assimilated into the law. French corporation law,

which is primarily statutory, has seen no comprehensive statutory
revision in almost a century; and while literally dozens of amendments

have been engrafted on to the basic corporate legislation of 1867, they
are for the most part ad hoc legislative resolutions of particular problems which betray no underlying unity of design and which have
* Member of the New York Bar.
1. The notion of the socit&anonyme as a creature of private agreement is particularly evident in the reports, debates and the like dealing with the enactment of the
basic corporate statute, the Law of July 24, 1867. Much of this material is reprinted
in Tnwrnm, Cou mENTAnE DE LA LoI Du 24 JuLwEr 1867 SuR LEs SocriaTs (1867);
see particularly, Premier Expos6 des Motifs d'un Project de Loi Sur les Socidt&s, in
1 Tuimpi, op. cit. supra at 9-12, and Premier Rapport Fait ii la Seance du 3 Mai 1867
au Nom de la Commission Charg6e d'Examiner le Project de Loi Sur les Socidt6s, in 1
TraPmR, op. cit. supra at 89, 94-97. This is not to imply, however, that the corporation
was not known or used in France or in the common law countries prior to the nineteenth century. The corporation was both a known and used form serving, however,
quite different social and economic ends than it came to serve during the nineteenth
century. See note 13 infra; CAaswELi , TH SoU= SE BUBBLE (1961); 1 BLACKSTONE,
Comm=ar~ums 467-85. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 517 (1819), seems to be the expression of a transitional view.
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broken the unity of the old legislation. 2 The result is that the law
is Janus faced, and the theories which the law embodies are not
wholly in accord with social and economic needs.
In this necessary process of assimilating new insights into the law
the French courts have a potentially important role. It is true that
the courts are said to exercise only a very limited law making power:
they are required to decide cases in terms of law, 3 which means

statutory law.4 Yet no statute can be so well drafted as to be com-

prehensive, and gaps inevitably appear. Faced with the need both
to create law and to avoid the charge of usurping legislative power,
the courts have had resort to the "spirit of the code" in order to
resolve disputes on which the legislature has not passed. But such a
rationalization becomes unacceptable when the code is shown to have
no unity of design, and when the "spirit," insofar as it is existent,
would dictate an inexpedient result. Thus there is born the attempt,
particularly on the part of the commentators, to construct conceptual
theories that will harmonize the seemingly discordant pattern of the
law and will allow the courts to produce or justify what is felt to be
an acceptable result.
It is the purpose of this essay to study one small facet of this
process of adaptation and change; to attempt to achieve some understanding of the French law governing the relation of the shareholders
to the societ anonyme, the French analogue of the corporation.5
However, it has not been thought possible or appropriate to present a
catalogue raisonee of shareholder powers. 6 Rather, the inquiry has
been limited to a more detailed analysis of three specific powers: the
power to amend the articles of incorporation, to allocate profits, and to
remove directors. But prior to the analysis of the substantive law
itself, the conceptual justifications that have been advanced to account
for those powers are discussed in their historical setting; and through2. The basic corporate statute is the Law of July 24, 1867, CODE DE COMMERCE art,
46 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963). Innumerable amendments to this law have been made
since its passage in 1867. For a list of the amendments see 4 EscAmIA, TRAr
THEOmQUE ET PRATIQuE DE DROrr CoArmmcLA&L 515-18 (1959).
3. CODE CrviL art. 5 (61st ed. Dalloz 1962). Cf. CODE Civxi art. 1 (5th ed. Rossel
1962) (Swiss).
4. DAvID & DE VnEs, THE FnENCH LEGAL SysTV 83 (1958).
5. It should be pointed out that while the term "corporation" is used interchangeably
with soci6t6 anonyme throughout this paper, in no sense is a legal equivalence between
the corporation and the socidt6 anonyme implied. The term corporation is used merely
because it is less awkward than the perhaps preferable translation of socit anonyme
as "stock company." But see, Conard, Forming a Subsidiary in the European Common
Market, 59 Micr. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1960).
6. This has been attempted elsewhere, see CHURcH, BUSINESS AssocIATIoNs UNDEat
See also MoREAu & BRESSAC, FRENCH CORPORATIONS
FRENcH LAw 437-73 (1960).
(1956); Becker, The Soci~t6 Anonyme and the Socidt6 i Responsabilit6 Limitee in
France,38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 835 (1963).
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out the function and importance of these concepts7 and the role of
the courts in the formulation and adaptation of the law will be
examined, as they have an important bearing on the interpretation
to be given to law itself.
I. CONCEPTS OF THE CORPRoATON AND OF SHAREHOLDER POWERS
A. The ContractualTheory
The classical concept of the socit6 anonyme is that it is the creature
of a contract entered into by the shareholders.8 This concept is said
to find its roots in Roman law, 9 and more recently in title 9, article
1832 of the Civil Code,10 which defines an association as a contract
by which the contracting parties pool their assets with a view to
sharing the resulting profits. However, article 1873 of the Civil Code"
specifies that the provisions of title 9, and article 1823 among them,
shall apply to business associations only to the extent that they are
not in conflict with the statutes and usages governing commercial
activity. Therefore the contractual definition of an association contained in the Civil Code applies to the socit6 anonyme only to the
extent that it is not inconsistent with the specific provisions of the
Commercial Code governing its creation and conduct.
The characterization given the soci6t6 anonyme (there is no formal
definition) in the now current provisions of the Commercial Code
is at best ambiguous.' 2 Further, the soci6t6 anonyme did not appear
in the Code full grown. In the period between its appearance in the
first Commercial Code of 1807 and its formalization in the Law of
July 24, 1867 there was a considerable period of growth and change.
7. For a discussion of the role of theory in the formation and interpretation of law,
see DAVID, LE Dnorr FRANCAIS 67-72 (1960); DAVID & DE Vnms, THE FRENCH LEGAL.
SYSTEM 81-85 (1958); Bn'ER, LES FoRcES CREATRiCES Du Dorr §§ 125, 134-35, 146
(1955); Lewy, Codification, Adaptability and Experience, in ESSAYS ON FRENCH LAw
1, 7-13 (1958); Cf. Julliot De La Morandi~re, The Draft of a New French Civil Code:

The Role of the Judge, 69 Haav. L. REV. 1264 (1956); Pound, The French Civil Code
and the Spirit of Nineteenth Century Law, 35 B.U.L. REV. 77 (1955).
8. For discussions of the "contractual" theory see e.g., GRANGER, LA NATURE JunmIQUE DES RAPPORTS ENTRE ACTIONNAIRFS CHARGES DU CONTROLE DANS LES SOCIETES
APPORTEES AUX STATUS DES SocrriEs ET DE SES CONSEQUENCES FISCALES (1912);
Roujou DE BOUBEE, EssAi Sun L'AcTE JuRmiQUE COLLECIF 53-55 (1961); RIPERT,
ASPECTs JURIDIQUES DU CAPITALISm MODERNE 90-92 (2d ed. 1951) [hereinafter cited
as RIPERT, AsPEcTs]; Canizares, The Rights of Shareholders, 2 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q.

564, 574-78 (1953).

9. 1 Rn-tET, TRArrE ELEMENTAIRE DE Daorr COMMERCIAL
[hereinafter cited as RiPERT, TArrE].

§ 661 (5th ed. 1963)

10. CODE Cvn.L art. 1832 (61st ed. Dalloz 1962).
11. CODE Cnm art. 1873 (61st ed. Dalloz 1962).

12. As will be developed more fully later, this ambiguity is the result of legislation
amending the Law of July 24, 1867 in a manner inconsistent with its "contractual" spirit.
See pp. 720-22 infra.
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And it is by reference to the changes that took place during this
period that the full implications of the contractual theory, of which
the Law of July 24, 1867 is an embodiment, may best be understood.
B. The Emergence of the ContractualTheory: The Historical
Background of the Law of July 24, 1867
While business associations whose members enjoyed limited liability, and whose interests in the venture were evidenced by transferable
shares, probably existed in France as far back as the seventeenth
century,13 the societe anonyme first received express legal sanction in
title III of the Commercial Code of 1807.14 This law recognized four
forms of business associations: the societ6 en nom collectif, or simple
partnership; the societ6 en commandite, or limited partnership; the
soci6t en commandite par actions, or limited stock partnership; and
the soci6t6 anonyme or corporation. 15 While for the most part the
Commercial Code of 1807 was merely declaratory of prior law and
custom,'16 it did introduce one significant modification: namely, it
permitted the'incorporation of the limited stock partnership (soci~te'
en commandite par actions) as a private or contractual matter,
dispensing with the previously required grant of the sovereign or the
legislature.17 While governmental authorization was still required in
order to establish a soci~t6 anonyme,"' the Commercial Code delegated this power to grant charters to the Conseil d'Etat,0 the highest
administrative court in France, permitting that body to specify the
terms and conditions under which corporate charters would be
granted.20 This delegation of legislative power together with the
specification by the delagee of the terms and conditions of the grant
may be regarded as the first step toward the recognition of the contractual nature of the societ6 anonyme, since one step had been taken
away from absolute discretion over such grants.
The half century succeeding the enactment of the Commercial
13. LEsCOEuI,

EssAi HISTORIQUE

Er CRITIQUE Sun LA LEGISLATION DES SOCIETES

CoMwnECIALES EN FRANCE ET A L'ET-ANcER 12 (1877); cf. 1 Tnn,im, op. cit. supra

note 1, at 33.
14. CODE DE ComMERcE art. 19 (Official ed. 1807).
15. CODE DE COMMmCE arts. 19, 38. (Official ed. 1807).

Strictly speaking a fifth

form of business association, the association en participation was also recognized by
the Code. CODE DE COMMERCE art. 47 (Official ed. 1807).

However, this form stands

apart from the other four types of associations and it appears to be little used. See
generally 1 RiPERT, Tit=r §§ 860-75.
16. 1 COPPER-ROER, TRArrE DES SocIEmTEs 295 (1938); LESCOEUR, op. cit. supra
note 13, at 7; EXPERT, ASPECTS 16.

17. CODE DE CoMwmcE arts. 38, 39 (Official ed. 1807).
18. CODE DE COMMCE art. 37 (Official ed. 1807).
19. 1 EXPERT, Tn~rrE § 975.

20. ibid.
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Code of 1807 saw little use of the soci6te anonyme.2 ' Several reasons
are apparent for this neglect. First of all the legal nature of the
corporate form seems to have been imperfectly understood. The
corporation as a grant of sovereign power was in the eighteenth
century a concept of public law,2 and only gradually did it assimilate
itself into private law thinking. Moreover, the lack of articulation in
the 1807 Code probably did little to inspire its use. More important,
however, was the fact that governmental authorization was retained as
a condition precedent to the use of the corporate form, and the
charter provisions, which were predetermined by the Conseil dEtat,
were restrictive in nature.23 In addition, the authorization once
granted could be withdrawn at any time.24 Finally, even if this severe
regulation and uncertainty was not objectionable, it was extremely
difficult for the more modest ventures to obtain the requisite authorization.2
On the other hand it was clear that the soci6t4 anonyme was a
vehicle ideally suited to the industrial expansion taking place during
the first half of the nineteenth century.2 The simple partnerships
were not able to raise the large capital required for complex industrial operations. Moreover, the absence of limitation on the liability
of the partners27 made this form extremely hazardous, especially in
an era of rapid industrial expansion and movement into new and
untried areas of commercial activity. While the limited stock partnership (societ4 en commandite par actions) obviated many of the
difficulties inherent in the simple partnership, and had the notable
advantage over the soci&t6 anonyme in that it could be incorporated
without prior governmental permission, it too had defects that
stemmed from its essentially hybrid form.28 The limited partners, for
example, were prohibited from taking an active part in the management of the business, 29 and failure to observe this restriction resulted
in the imposition of unlimited liability.3° Thus the limited partners
were reduced to a passive status not much above that of a creditor,
21. RiPERT, ASPECTS 60.
22. 1 RrPERT, TRAms § 972.
23. BIPERT, ASPECTS 59-60.
24. LEscomm, op. cit. supranote 13, at 29; RIPERT, ASPECTS 59-60..

25. 1 BIPERT, TAIArrE § 975.
26. See legislative hearings on the Commercial Code of 1807, 1 September 1807,
discussing the regulation of the socigtg anonyme in RODMAN, THE COMMERCIAL CODE
OF FRANCE 3, 13 (1814); BAUDOUiN-BUGNET & GozARD, LA DIRECTION DES SocrIEms
PAR ACTIONS EN FRANCE ET EN ALLEMAGNE 7-8 (1941); LESCOEUR, op. cit. supra

note 13, at 28.
27. CODE DE COMMERCE art. 22 (Official ed. 1807).
28. LESCOur, op. cit. supranote 13, at 5.
29. CODE DE COMmRCE art. 27 (Official ed. 1807).
30. CODE DE COMMERCE art. 28 (Official ed. 1807).
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with no power of supervision over the use of their invested capital.3
Further, if there was only one unlimited partner, as a prudent desire
to limit liability might dictate, his death or disability would disrupt
the enterprise. 32 Finally, while the commandite by its very nature is
a suitable vehicle for the exploitation of a particular talent, it is not
managerial hierarchy
suited to an enterprise that requires an extensive
33
as is true of most large commercial ventures.
In the attempt to gain the best of both worlds, that is, the benefits
of the commandite without its above enumerated drawbacks, and the
advantages of the societg anonyme without its prerequisite of governmental authorization and subsequent supervision, a form of commandite came into use which, while adhering on the surface to34 the
legal form of the commandite was in reality a societ4 anonyme.
The key to this legerdemain was the issuance of the stock of the
limited stock partnership in bearer form. By this device there was no
way of knowing who the limited partners were, and hence no way
of enforcing the prohibition on their taking an active part in the
management of the association.35 Further, the hazard of unlimited
liability for the general partner could be effectively eliminated by
the simple expedient of using a straw man obedient to the will of the
shareholders. 36 By using these rather obvious means, the limited
stock partnership having all the attributes of a socie't6 anonyme was
patent
freely creatable by a simple private contract. Despite the
37
courts.
the
by
validated
was
it
scheme
this
of
transparency
In the absence of effective regulation, this separation of responsibility from power inevitably led to abuses. The twenty years from
1830 to 1850 have been characterized as the period of the "fievre des
commandites" in France.38 Various schemes to check these abuses
were devised, notably the Law of July 17-23, 1856. But this law, as
its proposed predecessors, was an essentially stop-gap measure. And
behind all the abuses lay the rather simple economic fact that there
was a pressing need for a flexible instrument of industrial expansion
encumbered with a minimum of governmental regulation.
it is perhaps a law of life that whatever is important is respectable.
And the sociMt6 en commandite par actions, in its perverted form,
which had by 1867 clearly become an important economic tool, found
its respectability in the Law of July 24, 1867.
31. Cf. CODE DE CoMMEmcE art. 23 (Official ed. 1807) in which the limited partners
are characterized as "mere bailors of funds.'
32. Ibid.
33. LESCOEUR, op. cit. supra note 13, at 25-27.
34. LESCOEur, op. cit. supra note 13, at 34.

35. Ibid.
36. 1 CoPPER-RoTER, TRArrE DES SocEs 324 (1938).

37. LEscoEun, op. cit. supranote 13, at 35-41.
38. RIPERT, ASPECTS 60.
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The Law of July 24, 1867, which even today is the basic statute
governing the formation and functioning of business associations, was
a complete revision of the provisions of the Commercial Code of 1807
relating to business associations. But it is significant that while the
law of 1867 was a complete statutory reform, in essence it did little
more than codify the practice that had grown up under the 1807
Code.39 In particular the practices that had grown up around the
societ6 en commandite par actions were given legislative sanction in
the new regulations pertaining to the soci6tg anonyme. This process
of legitimation was achieved in two steps. First of all the legislature
passed the Law of May 24, 1863 which brought into being a new
form of business association called the socidte a responsibilite
limitde (SARL).40 This law accorded to the new form of association
all the attributes of the "perverted form" of the societe en commandite
par actions which had grown up under the 1807 Code, with two
principal exceptions: associations incorporated under the new law
were limited to a capitalization of twenty million francs or less41 and
could not have fewer than seven shareholders. The second step in
this process was carried out by the Law of July 24, 1867 itself. That
law adopted the provisions of the Law of May 23, 1863 almost
verbatim for the socit6 anonyme,42 dropping, however, the restriction
on capitalization. 43 The process was made complete by the provision
that: "Henceforth socitMs anonymes may be formed without governmental authorization. They may, whatever the number of associates,
be formed by private agreement. ..."
That this provision, which makes applicable to the socidt6 anonyme
the contractual definition of an association embodied in Article 1832
of the Civil Code,45 is the guiding "spirit" of the legislation may be
seen from a brief review of its provisions. Of the thirty-one articles
of the Law of July 24, 1867, relating directly to the societ6 anonyme,
seventeen relate to the process of establishing or dissolving the
juridical entity. The remaining fourteen relate to the functioning of
the corporation once it has been established. 46 But of these fourteen,
only one47 strictly speaking relates to the internal management of the
39. Cf. 1 Tiuma, op. cit. supra note 1, at 35-36, 163.
40. Art. 1, Law of May 23, 1863, 12 RECuEIL GENERAL DES SENATUS-CONSULTES
Lois DECRETS Er AmmarEs 433 (1863) [hereinafter cited as RECUEm]. This is not
to be confused with the modem S.A.R.L. Authorized by the law of 7 March 1925,
CODE DE COMMERCE art. 46 at 85 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963).
41. Art. 3, Law of May 23, 1863, 12 RECUEIL at 435.
42. Art. 2, Law of May 23, 1863, 12 REcUEm at 433.

43. 1 TRipEm, op. cit. supra note 1, at 41.
44. Art 21, Law of July 24, 1867, CODE DE COMMERCE at 104 (Dalloz ed. 1877).
45. CODE CsvuL art. 1832 (61st ed. Dalloz 1962).
46. Law of July 24, 1867 arts. 22, 27-37, 40, 43, CODE DE COMMERCE (Dalloz ed.
1877).
47. Law of July 24, 1867, art. 22, CODE DE COMMERCE at 105 (Dalloz ed. 1877).
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corporation; and thirteen are aimed essentially at shareholder protection so that the abuses connected with the socie'te' en commandite par
actions would not continue when the essential form of the commandite
was codified for the societ6 anonyme. Thus the management, internal
structure, and conduct of the soci6t6 anonyme were left in large
measure to private agreement. The contractual concept of the corporation had achieved its majority.
C. The InstitutionalTheory
In time, three principal criticisms were leveled at the contractual
theory. First, it was pointed out that the theoretical status of shareholders as contracting parties did not accord with their status in fact.
Ignoring the fact that the corporate form was used by the small
family business as well as the large public corporation, critics of the
contractual theory pointed out that the wide dispersion of stock and
the absence of a common bond among the shareholders made meaningless any theory of the corporation premised on the fact that the
soci~t6 anonyme was an embodiment of shareholder agreement."
Second, even apart from any question as to the factual status of the
shareholders, Article 28 of the Law of July 24, 1867, 49 which granted
to a mere majority of the shareholders the power to exercise shareholder prerogatives, seemed to cut deeply into the theoretical right of
a dissenting minority not to be contractually bound without their
consent.5
Finally, and perhaps most important, new corporate legislation
enacted to amend and amplify the Law of July 24, 1867 seemed to
fly in the face of the freedom of the contracting parties. Not only
did the process of legislative intervention increase in frequency, but
also the character of that legislation was totally different in that it
sought to intervene in the everyday management of corporate affairs,
the area that under the Law of July 24, 1867 had been left to shareholder choice.51 This process of legislative intervention reached its
peak in the Law of November 16, 1940,52 which specified in considerable detail the internal management powers and the managerial
structure of the societe anonyme and made its provisions mandatory
for all existing and future socie'tes anonymes.
It was the increased particularism of the legislation relating to the
societ6 anonyme that suggested to these critics that rather than regard
48. Ri'ERT,

ASPECTS

93-96.

49. CODE DE COMMERCE at 109 (Dalloz ed. 1877).
50. BEaR, L'ExERCISE DU PouvoM DANS LES SOCIETES COINIMECIALES 11 (1961).

51. See pp. 719-20 supra.
52. As amended by the Law of March 4, 1943 and July 7, 1953, CODE DE COMMERCE art. 46, at 74 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963).
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the corporate form as the creature of a contract among the share-

holders which embodied and expressed their collective agreement,
the corporation should be regarded as an institution, or creature

authorized and defined by the state, which could be brought into
being by private action.53 Although there seem to be as many

versions of the institutional theory as there are commentators, 5 and

most of the versions are at best ill-defined, 55 there runs through them

all a common thread:
It is known that since the end of the nineteenth century certain concepts
of public law have been, to some degree, assimilated into the area of private
law. This is especially true of the theory of the institution which dominates
the totality of the rights of collectives .... It is recognized today that the

substance of the legislation [relating to] corporations is the institutional
theory . .

.

.The soci&t6 anonyme thus becomes an institution of private

law, that is, a grouping of persons coming together in their common
interest-the corporate purpose-by means of a permanent organization in
which, by virtue of legal regulation, each organ of the corporation has a
predetermined function which may not be modified or renounced.5 6

In addition to the implicit sanctioning of the institutional theory by
the legislature, it also pointed out that this theory has been adopted

by the Cour de Cassationin Socit6 anonyme de Teinture et dClmpressions v. Motte, where the court characterized the societe anonyme as:

"an association hierarchial in structure, in which the management is
exercised by a board of directors elected by the annual meeting of

shareholders; [and] that it does not pertain, therefore, to the annual
meeting [of shareholders] to encroach upon the powers of the board
in matters of administration. . ...-97
The institutional theory itself, however, is not without its critics.58
It would seem that the essential question in this regard is Whether,
as a practical matter of defining shareholder powers when there is

no direct statutory reference, it helps to call the societe anonyme an
53. 1 RPEnRT,

TRArnE

§ 663 (5th ed. 1963). For a similar view see, 1 DEwiNc, THE

FINANcr . POLICY OF CO'ORATIONS
54. Cf. RiPERT, ASPECTS 96.
55. 1 RiPERT, TRA-rE § 663.

8-13 (5th ed. 1953).

56. Leblonde, Les Pouvoirs Respectifs de l'Assembl6e G4n&ale du Cons~il d'Administration, du Pr6sident-DirecteurG~n ral et du Directeur-GCn~ralAdjoint d a n s la
Doctrine Institutionelle, [1957] GAzErrE DE PALAis (I) (DocriNE)' 29 [hereinafter
cited as GAz. PAL.]. See also GRANGER, op. cit. supra note 8, at 53-78; 2 MoLmAc,
MAxuEL DEs SocETES

(1938).

§ 967 (1959); 1

RENArUm, LA TiEolUE

DE L'INsTrrunON

57. Cass. Civ. 4 Juin 1946, [1947] Jums-CLAssEum PEIODIQUE: La Semaine
Juridique (II) 3518 [hereinafter cited as J.C.P.].
58. Toulemon, Evolution des Soci6t&s Anonymes en France: R6formes Possibles,
[1956] REvuE TImESTmRELLE DE Dnorr ComwEsacrAL 219, 220-21; Toulemon, L'Avenir
des Soci~t6s Anonymes, [1957] REvuE TmESTrIELLE .DE
Dnorr CoMNMERCIAL 913,
914-15 [hereinafter cited as REv. Tnms. DR. Co MsM.].
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"institution." If by "institution" is meant merely another conceptual
label, then clearly the answer is no. The contrary is true, however,
if by "institution" is meant a mode of approaching problems of shareholder power with the dual recognition that contractual freedom may
not in all circumstances be the instrument best adapted to protect
the shareholder, and that the aggregation that comprises a corporation
may well involve interests other than those of the shareholder which
should be recognized and protected. Unfortunately, this latter view
infrequently prevails among French writers, and the criticism that
the rubric "institution" is merely "a convenient word that dispenses
with research into [the corporation's legal] composition and origin,"50
is well taken.
It is against this background, this warring of ideas, that the statutory
and decisional law pertaining to shareholder powers will be examined.
The attempt will be made, ancillary to the analysis of the substantive
law itself, to determine the extent to which the substantive law is
merely an application of rigidly logical concepts or embodies the
recognition of the social and economic forces at work.
II.

SHAREHOLDER POWER TO AMEND

THE ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION

A. The Power of the Majority to Effect Amendments
One of the most difficult problems for adherents of the now discredited contractual theory of the societ anonyme, is the reconciling
of this theory with the admitted power of fewer than all the shareholders to effect amendments to the articles of incorporation binding
on the dissenting shareholders. 60 The problem, of course, lies not
with the mere existence of this power, but with the notion that the
articles of incorporation, as a contract among the shareholders, may
be modified and even completely suspended by fewer than all the
contracting parties. 61 The problem is further aggravated by the
tendency of both the Commercial Code and the courts to limit in
certain respects the power of even all the shareholders to amend
certain provisions of the articles.
Article 31 of the Law of July 24, 1867, as originally promulgated,
implicitly seems to recognize, under the guise of a quorum requirement, the power of the holders of a majority of the shares present or
represented at an extraordinary general meeting (assemblhe g'n~rale
59. Ibid.
60. French law does not recognize the distinction observed in the United States
between articles of incorporation and by-laws. The function of both instruments is
subsumed by the statuts of a socit6 anonyme. I have, however, used "articles of
incorporation" as the equivalent of the term statuts, rather than in its strict English
sense.
61. BERa, op. cit. supra note 50, § 225; RipEnT, AsPECrs 95-96.
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extraordinaire) to amend the articles of incorporation.62 However,
such a recognition of a majority power would be inconsistent with the
assumed contractual basis of the soci~te anonyme, unless article 31
were construed narrowly to mean merely that it provided a quorum
requirement for those cases where the articles of incorporation provided for amendment, that is, for those cases where the dissenting
minority had contractually agreed in advance to be bound by the
decision of the majority. 63 But, as a matter of contract law such an
interpretation of article 31 would be sound only if the amendment in
question were previously envisaged by the shareholders, and in addition did not amount to a change so fundamental that the entire
contract would be superseded.6 Moreover, absent any express stipulation in the articles granting such a power to the majority, no amendments whatever could be made, since this narrow construction of
article 31 assumes that it imposes its quorum requirements as a
protection to the shareholders only in those cases where the articles
62. CODE DE CoMmERcE at 110 (Dalloz ed. 1877). It should be pointed out that
French law recognizes three types of forums at which the "common" shareholders
may exercise their franchise; the assembl&e gdn~rale ordinaire, the assemblZe g~n&ale
extraordinaire, and the assemblde constitutif. The power that the shareholders may
collectively exercise at the assemble g~nrale extraordinaire is the power to amend
the articles of incorporation. 1 RiPERT, TRAiTE § 1195. On the other hand
the assemble g6n~rale ordinaire is itself divided into two sub-types; the assemble g~n~rale ordinaire itself, that is the annual meeting, and the assembl&e
g~n~rale ordinaire tenue extraordinairement, or special meeting. 1 RiPERT, TRArrE §
The powers of the shareholders at the two types of assemblies
1171.
g~n~rales ordinaires are identical: that is, generally, they may pass on the corporation's
balance sheet and income statement, declare dividends, elect directors, and take all
other action (except amendment of the articles) within shareholder competence. 1
§ 1192. The sole distinction between the two types of
RIPERT, TAA=rrs
assemblies g~ngrales ordinaires is the time when the meeting is convened, that is,
whether it is the annual meeting or a special meeting. On the other hand, as between
the assembl&e g~n~rale ordinaire (whether annual or special) and the assembl~e
g~n~rale extraordinaire,in addition to the above noted difference in powers, there are
differing quorum requirements. 1 Rn'xRT, TPA.-E §§ 1181, 1199. The third
type of forum is the assemblge constitutif, which is the shareholder meeting held
just after incorporation, at which the articles of incorporation are ratified, and other
necessary acts taken. The shareholder powers exercised at this meeting are not discussed in this paper, and no further mention is made of this type of meeting.
Despite the tendency of French commentators to analyze the powers exercised by
shareholders collectively in terms of the forum at which the individual shareholder
may exercise his franchise, this mode of analysis does not imply any overriding legal
significance of the forum itself. Therefore it has been felt proper to disregard the
forum during the course of the analysis adopted in this paper except insofar as the
applicable quorum or other requirements represent a substantive modification of
the power itself.
63. P qiut, op. cit. supranote 8, at 24-26; RiPERT, AsPECTs 95.
64. CODE Civm art. 1134 (6th ed. Dalloz 1907). This provision has remained unchanged to the present time, see CODE CrviL art. 1134 (61st ed. Dalloz 1962); Rn, RT,
AspEcrs 95.
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had a provision for their
amendment, and is not a general grant of
65
power to the majority.
This somewhat baroque interpretation of article 31 designed to
bring it into harmony with the contractual theory, although originally
accepted by the courts, 66 was ultimately rejected. The reason for the
rejection was merely that practical considerations made it mandatory
that fewer than all the shareholders be able to make modifications
in the articles to accommodate the structure and purpose of the
corporation to changing conditions. But the process of rejection was
not a sudden modification of the prior view. Rather it proceeded in
two steps: first it was held that even if the articles did not expressly
permit shareholder amendment, such amendments were permitted by
article 31, provided the amendments did not modify the shareholder
agreement in a fundamental respect. 67 This view, called the theory
of bases essentielles, was adopted by the Cour de Cassationin Soci tt
genrales des fournitures militaires v. Perdrix.6a But even such an
interpretation of article 31, although conceptually justifiable, was as
a practical matter untenable, since it led to overrefined distinctions
as to what constituted a modification fundamental in nature, and allowed to every shareholder a veto power over any amendment that fit
this decisional rubric.
The second step in this process of the rejection of the contractual
interpretation of article 31 was the passage of the Law of November
22, 1913.69 This law provided, with two exceptions,. 0 that an assemble g6nerale extraordinaire,properly constituted, could amend the
articles of incorporation in all respects, notwithstanding anything to
the contrary in the articles themselves. This statutory provision was
regarded not as an amendment of article 31, but rather as merely a
gloss which restored to that article the meaning intended at the
time of its passage.7 '
Despite the plain meaning of the Law of November 22, 1913, its
application was resisted on the ground that under Article 2 of the
65. NomE.,

LES

TENDANCES

MODERNES

DE

LA

JURISPRUDENCE

Er MATiEnEs DE SoCmTEs ANoN mES 82 (1958); PiNEu, op. cit.

COMaUMCIALE

&upranote 8, at

24-26.
66. See, e.g., Durand v. Tobouet, Cour d'Appel de Paris, July 30, 1891, [1892]
JourNAL DES Socm-rEs CrvmES Er COMmERCIALES 107 [hereinafter cited as J. Soc.].
67. NOmEL, op. cit. supranote 64, at 83.
68. Cass. Civ., 30 May 1892, [1893] REcuErr DALLOZ DE DOCTNNE DE JuusPR)DENcE ET DE LEIsLATION (I) 105, 115 [hereinafter cited as BEc. DALLOZ]; PINEAU,
op. cit. supra note 8, at 27-31.
69. Law of November 22, 1913, amending art. 31 of Law of July 24, 1867, CODE
DE COMMERCE at 44 (25th ed. Dalloz 1928).
70. See p. 729 infra.
71. 1 CoPPai-RoYER, TRArE DES SocrETEs 604-05 (1938).
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Civil Code,72 it could not have retroactive effect and therefore could
apply only to those societ~s anonymes incorporated subsequent to
its passage. 73 This argument was rejected by the courts"4 on the
ground that the Law of November 22, 1913 was merely a clarification
of existing legislation, but the issue was not finally resolved until the
passage of the Law of May 1, 1930, 75 which superseded the Law of
November 22, 1913 and clearly established the power of the shareholders to amend the articles.
B. Limitations on the Power Through the Use of Quorum and
Voting Requirements

Concurrently with the above described establishment of the power
of an assembl6e g6ndrale extraordinaireto amend the articles, there
were successive legislative changes in the quorum requirement of
such an assemblde to validly exercise this power. Article 29 of the
Law of July 24, 186776 provided that in order to be validly constituted
an assembl6e generale must be composed of shareholders who, as an
aggregate, hold stock representing no less than one fourth of the
corporation's capital. However, in the case of the shareholders meeting called to amend the articles of incorporation, that is, in the case
of the assembl.e g~ntrale extraordinaire, Article 31 of the Law of
July 24, 1867 increased this quorum requirement from one fourth to
one half.7
When the Law of November 22, 1913 was passed affirming the
power of the assemble g~n4rale extraordinaireto amend the articles,
72. "A law applies only to the future; it has no retroactive effect." CODE Civi art.
2 (61st ed. Dalloz 1962).
73. See Houpin, De La R6troactivite de Nouvel Art. 31 de la Loi du 24 Juillet
1867, [1914] J. Soc. 241.
74. See, e.g., Soci6t6 Lacarri6re v. Veaudeau, Cour d'Appel de Paris, 15 January
1914, [1914] J. Soc. 255, 259. For the citation of additional cases, see 1 CooPERRoym, TRArrE DES SocrrEs 608 (1938).
75. Law of May 1, 1930, amending art. 31 Law of July 24, 1867, CODE DE CoNrMcERCE 35 (42d ed. Dalloz 1946).
76. As a practical matter the determination of whether or not a quorum is present
at any given meeting is made by inspecting the feuille de pr~sence, an attendance
list which each shareholder attending the meeting, or his proxy, is required to sign,
and on which must appear the names and addresses of all shareholders together with
the number of shares each holds. Art. 28, Law of July 24, 1867, as amended, Decree
Law August 31, 1937, CODE DE CoamanCE art. 46, at 38-39 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963).
This list must be certified as correct by the bureau de l'assemb~e, the persons who
conduct the meeting, see Becker, The Soci&tg Anonyme and the Soci~t6 a ResponsabilitM Limit~e in France, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 835, 873 (1963), and must be made available at the head office of the corporation to anyone requesting to see it. Art 28, Law
of July 24, 1867, as amended, Decree Law of August 31, 1937, CODE DE ComnmCE
art. 46, at 38-39 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963).
77. At the assembles g6ndrales extraordinaires, as at all other assembles
gdnirales, a resolution was passed by a simple majority. Art. 28, Law of July 24, 1867,
CODE DE ComiaucE at 109 (Dalloz ed. 1877).
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both the quorum and voting requirements were raised, presumably,
in order to provide some measure of protection to the dissenting
minority. Thus paragraph 3 of Article 1 of the Law of November 22,
1913 provides:
Meetings to pass amendments . . . are validly constituted and may validly
deliberate only if they are composed of the number of stockholders representing not less than three-fourths of the corporation's capital. The resolution, in order to be valid, must be passed by two-thirds of the votes of the
shares held by shareholders present or represented. 78

Further, that article provides that charter provisions limiting access
to shareholder meetings called to amend the articles are of no effect.10
However, recognizing that such a quorum may often be in fact
unattainable, this law allows a second meeting to be called, if the
first meeting does not achieve the requisite quorum, at which the
quorum requirement is reduced to one-half. If that also fails, a third
meeting may be called at which the quorum is still further reduced
to one-third. However, as a measure of shareholder protection such
second and third meetings with their reduced quorum requirements
may be held only if certain publication requirements are met which
are not required of the first meeting.
These provisions were re-enacted without substantial modification
in the Law of May 1, 1930.80
The only further modification of the quorum requirement to date
has been that made by the Law of February 25, 1953, which reduced
the quorum requirement of the first meeting from two-thirds to onehalf, that of the second meeting from one-half to one-third, and finally
that of the third meeting from one-third to one-fourth. 81
These gradual reductions in the quroum requirement, in conjunction with the almost minimal quorum requirements for the second
and third meetings represent a further erosion of the contractual
theory, and widen markedly the power of fewer than all the share78. Article 1, para. 3 of the Law of November 22, 1913, amending art. 31 of the

Law of July 24, 1867, CODE DE COMMERCE at 44 (25th ed. Dalloz 1928).
79. This provision was subsequently amended to permit such restrictions provided

that they pertained to all shares alike. 1 RiPERT, TArrE § 1198. For the restrictions
permitted in the case of any assemble gingrale ordinaire see 1 RiPERT, TRArrE
§§ 1178-79.
80. Amending art. 31, Law of July 1867, CODE DE CoxrumcE at 35 (42d ed. Dalloz
1946).
81. Law of February 25, 1953, amending art. 31, Law of July 24, 1867, CODE DE
COMMERCE art. 46 at 39-40 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963). The requirement noted above

that the resolution to be valid must be passed by two-thirds vote has remained

unchanged since the Law of November 22, 1913. See para. 6, art. 31, Law of July 24,
1867, as amended, CODE DE COMMERCE art. 46 at 40 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963); see
generally, Note, [1953] REv. Tnms. DR. Coixm. 438, 439-43; but cf. art. 28, Law of

July 24, 1867, CODE DE COMMlERCE art. 46, at 38 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963).
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holders to amend the articles. While it is true that this trend has
been, to a degree, offset by more restrictive notice provisions and an
increase from one-half to two-thirds the vote required to pass an
amendment, this in no way modifies the conclusion that the law in
this area has been progressively moving away from a contractual
analysis toward a more factual analysis of the collateral protection to
be afforded the minority.
C. Direct Limitations on the Power of the Assembl6e G6nerale
Extraordinaire
The gradual expansion of the power of fewer than all the contracting parties to amend the articles of incorporation, examined above,
represents merely one aspect of the attack on the contractual theory.
Simultaneously, a second corollary of that theory was also being
attacked: namely, the power of the shareholders to amend the articles
of incorporation by unanimous consent.
As was noted previously, Article 31 of the Law of July 24, 1867,
as originally promulgated, contained no specification as to the breadth
of the shareholder power to amend the articles. If one regards the
articles as a contract, then the parties, acting unanimously, may
make such changes as they desire providing only that the changes are
not substantively illegal. However, this theoretical power has been
changed in three respects. First, there appear with increasing frequency statutory provisions regulating the internal structure of the
societe anonyme and the powers of its management. 82 Thus these
provisions regulate matters formerly left to shareholder choice, and
to that extent restrict the substance of the shareholder power to
amend. Secondly, while in other areas shareholder power to amend
is unquestioned, there is the increasing tendency to recognize the
interests of third parties in such amendments and consequently to
require their consent to any such changes. Thus, in effect, in these
cases the power of the shareholders is reduced to that of mere
initiators of change. Finally, certain provisions in the articles, although a matter of less than unanimous shareholder choice at the
time of incorporation, cannot be subsequently changed except by
unanimous consent.
The first limitation was an inevitable result of the increased specificity of the law respecting the division of powers within the societe
anonyme. The Law of July 24, 1867, while including considerable detail as to the procedural process of incorporation, failed to detail the
powers exercised by the shareholders on one hand and the directors,
82. As was noted previously at pp. 719-20 supra, the Law of July 24, 1867 left the
internal structure of the corporation and the extent of shareholder powers largely to
the articles of incorporation.
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officers and auditors on the other. One further aspect of this restrictive legislation should be noted. Since 1940, in passing legislation that
made modifications in the structure of the soci~te anonyme, the
legislature has removed from the sole competence of the shareholders

the power to amend the articles of incorporation to bring them into
conformity with the new substantive law. Thus, Article 5 of the Law

of November 16, 194083 granted to the board of directors the power
to amend the articles to bring them into conformity with the
substantive provisions of that law, requiring only that the shareholders
should ratify the board action at their next meeting. And Article 9 of
the Law of February 25, 19538 went one step further and, in dispensing with the ratification requirement, required only that the

board notify the shareholders of the changes that had been made.
Thus the power of the shareholders to amend the articles is reduced
in two respects: the law not only specifies what amendments are to
be made, but it also takes from the shareholders the sole competence
to make the required changes.

The second limitation on the power of the shareholders to amend
the articles arises from legislative recognition of the interests of third
parties in such amendments. Thus Article 20 of the Decree-Law of
October 30, 19351 provides that:
The meeting [of holders of debt instruments] also may pass on:-(1) all
proposals of the debtor corporation relative to:-(a) modifications of the
form [capital structure] of the corporation;- (b) merger of the corporation
with another corporation;-(c) issuance of debt obligations having a preference higher than that of the obligations held by those at the meeting.
If the debtor corporation fails to secure the approval of the meeting of the
holders of debt instruments to its proposals, the debtor corporation may
not pass such resolutions except after having reimbursed such holders as
may make demands within three months ....

Similarly, Article 9 of the Law of January 23, 19298 provides that,

"In the case of all corporations having issued founders shares
modifications concerning the object or form of the corporation are

valid only if a meeting of the holders of founders shares, held in
accordance with the provisions of article 6, shall have approved such

modifications."8 7

83. CODE DE COm2vicE art. 46, at 76 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963).
84. CODE DE Com7mRxcE art. 46, at 81 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963).
85. CODE DE COMMERCE art. 46, at 69 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963).
86. CODE DE COMMMCE art. 46, at 59-60 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963).
87. Broadly speaking founders' shares may be characterized as a promoter's interest,
holders of which have no right to the assets of the corporation on liquidation and no
right to share in corporate profits absent specific provisions in the articles to the contrary. They are a special class of "quasi securities," whose function is to allow the
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The third and final restriction on the power of the shareholders to
amend the articles of incorporation finds its roots in the Law of
November 22, 1913.8 As was mentioned previously,89 article 1 of that
law provides: "[N]otwithstanding anything to the contrary in the
articles of incorporation, the assemblhe gdnerale... may amend the
articles of incorporation in all respects...." This provision was carried forward in the Law of May 1, 1930,90 which was passed to clarify
the ambit of the Law of November 22, 1913.
The sweeping language of article 1, as has been noted, has been
modified both by the tendency of the legislature to narrow the area
of shareholder choice by the specification of mandatory charter provisions, and by granting the directors the power to implement them.
A further specific exception to this broad language was made by the
Laws of November 22, 1913 and May 1, 1930 themselves: namely,
the shareholders, short of unanimity, could not validly amend the
articles to effect either a change in the nationality of the corporation
or an augmentation of the obligation of the shareholders. 91
This in itself is hardly a substantial curtailment of shareholder
power, and this curtailment was further reduced by the Law of
February 25, 1953, as modified by Ordinance No. 59-123 of January
7, 1959, 9' which allows, with certain exceptions, an amendment of the
articles passed by the "normal" two-thirds majority to effect a change
93
in the corporation's nationality.
Even prior to the Law of February 25, 1953, however, the shareholders could by amendment of the articles, change the corporate
seat or siege social, to another location within the French Republic,
since such a change did not constitute a change of the nationality.
services of promoters to be compensated without violating the legal requirement that
stock only be issued for money or kind and not for services. See arts. 1, 4, 24, Law
of July 24, 1867, as amended, art. 28 of the Decree of August 4, 1949, CODE DE
COMMERCE art. 46, at 23, 27, 36 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963). While there is no counterpart of founders' shares in United States jurisdictions, essentially the same result has
been sought and perhaps can be achieved by the judicious use of senior securities. See
Herwitz, Allocation of Stock Between Services and Capital in the Organization of a
Close Corporation, 75 HAnv. L. REv. 1098 (1962). The rights of holders of founders'
shares are governed by the Law of January 29, 1929, as amended, Law of February
25, 1953, CODE DE COMMERC E art. 46, at 57-61 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963). See generally
1 RIPERT, TRArrE §§ 1334-65.
See Becker, The Socitd Anonyme and
the Socidt6 il Responsabilit6 Limit6e in France, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 835, 845, 849-50
(1963).
88. Amending art. 31, Law of July 24, 1867, CODE DE COmMERCE at 44 (25th ed.
Dalloz 1928).
89. See p. 724 supra.
90. Amending art. 31, Law of July 24, 1867, CODE DE CoMvnMcE 35 (42d ed.
Dalloz 1946).
91. 2 MoLEnRAc, MAUEL DES SocIEms §§ 1262-64 (1959).
92. CODE DE CoMmERcE art. 46 at 39, 84 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963).
93. On the nationality of a corporation under French law, see generally Note, 74
HcAnv. L. REv. 1429 (1961).
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The situs of the siege social could be a matter of shareholder concern, since French law requires both directors' and shareholders'
meetings to be held there. Thus a change of the sidge from continental France to one of the territories would in effect mean that nearly
all the shareholders would be precluded from taking part in the
meeting in person. Despite this fact, the Law of May 24, 1 9 5 1 , 94 which
is still in force, permits the board of directors, with the concurrence
of the French Minister of Finance, to change at will the sige social
of the corporation.
The statutory distribution of competence to amend the articles, and
the statutory grant to certain categories of interested persons to exercise limited veto power over such amendments, described above, has
resulted in a legislative pattern of Byzantine complexity. It is difficult
to see any theory of shareholder power emerge from this pattern; indeed it is doubtful whether its enactment over half a century was the
result of anything but an attempt to deal in an ad hoc manner with
specific problems as they arose. At any rate one thing is abundantly
clear: the shareholder power to amend can no longer be rationalized
on the theory of the articles as a contract. Further, since this particular shareholder power is so inclusive, potentially encompassing
within it the power to make modifications and changes in so many
aspects of the corporation, its curtailment must necessarily raise the
question whether the contractual definition of the societ4 anonyme
embodied in Article 1832 of the Civil Code retains, in the face of this
explicit commercial legislation, any validity whatever.
III.

SHAREHOLDER POWER OVER ThE DISTRIBUTION

OF NET PRoFrrs

A. The Scope of the Power
Although the French Commercial Code has no specific provision
according to shareholders the power to declare dividends, this power
is regarded as implied in Articles 10, 27 and 36 of the Law of July 24,
1867. 95 Further, Article 1832 of the Civil Code which provides that
"An association is a contract (contrat) by which two or more96
persons agree to combine their resources with a view to dividing the
94. Amending art. 31, Law of July 24, 1867, CODE DE Co~MmEcE art. 46, at 40 (59th
ed. Dalloz 1963).
95. CODE DE COMMERCE art. 46 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963); see, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIE
JurIDIQUE: REPERTOIRE DE DRorr COMMERCIAL ET DES SocssTas, Dividend § 86 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as ENCYCLOPEDiE DA I,OZ]; 1 Rn'EiT, TRATE § 1473(1); cf. BEau,
op. cit. supra note 50, § 251.
96. In the case of the socit6 anonyme, however, there must be no fewer than seven
shareholders. Art. 23, Law of July 24, 1867, CODE DE CoMEmcE art. 46, at 36 (59th
ed. Dalloz 1963).
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(Emphasis and footnote added)

renders any further specification superfluous.
On the other hand, it seems clear that the law does not contemplate that the shareholders themselves should determine the extent
of the funds out of which the dividends may be paid.9 8 Article 32 of
the Law of July 24, 1867 provides that the supervisory auditors
(commissaires aux comptes) should, at the annual meeting of the
shareholders, state the reasons, if any, for not approving the accounts
presented by the directors 9 Thus, at its narrowest, this statutory
power may be interpreted merely as the power to approve or disapprove of the management proposal of funds available for distribution, as distinguished from the power to initiate the proposal in the
first instance and then act upon it.
But such an interpretation seems unduly restrictive. It is clear, for
example, that the directors must present to the annual shareholders
meeting the income statement and balance sheet of the corporation
for the prior year.10 0 Since a failure by the directors to do so results
in severe penalties, 10 1 it is fairly certain that the shareholders have
access to information as to the full extent of funds available for distribution as dividends. Moreover, not only are the shareholders accorded
the power to declare dividends at the annual meeting, but they are
also charged with the duty of apportioning the profits of the corporation as between various reserves on the one hand and as between
the reserves and the dividend on the other.10 2 Thus it would seem
that by means of this power to allocate available funds to various
existing or newly created reserves, the shareholders may to that extent
lessen the funds out of which dividends may be paid. Theoretically,
then, the shareholders do have a measure of control over the dividend
payable, and this power extends further than mere approval or dis97.

CODE

CiviL art. 1832 (61st ed. Dalloz 1962).

98. See generally Copper-Royer, La Notion de BUnfice dans le Contract de
Societ6, [1939] REVUE SPECIALE DE DocTmNE ET DE JURISPRUDENCE CONCERNANT LES
Soc=mES 115.
99. Art. 34, Law of July 24, 1867, amended, Decree Law of August 8, 1935, CODE
DE COmERCE art. 46, at 44 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963).
100. Art. 35, Law of July 24, 1867, as amended, Decree Law, October 30, 1935,
COMMERC E art. 46, at 44-45 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963); Dalsace, L'Actionnaire
et lAssembl6e G~ngrale de la Soci6t6 Anonyme, [1960] REVUE DES SOCrTEs 258, 263-5.

CODE DE

101. Ibid.
102. While it is clear that the annual meeting of shareholders must make the
requisite apportionment of profits to the reserves required by law and the articles
of incorporation, I RPEnT, TRArrE §§ 1456, 1463, 1473(2), there has been
some dispute as to whether, absent a specific grant of power in the articles, the

annual meeting of shareholders may itself establish reserves and allocate profits to
them. However, it seems widely recognized that absent a direct prohibition on such
action in the articles they may do so. LACOMBE, LES RESERVES DANS LES SOCI"Es PAR
ACnONS 103-19 (1962); 1 RIPERT, TRAms §§ 1466, 1467, 1469; Autesserre, De la Licite

de la Libre Constitution des R6serves par les Soci~ts, [1960] REvuE DES SoclrEs 1.
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approval of the management proposal. It is thus more accurate to
power as the power to allocate the
characterize this shareholder
10 3
profits of the enterprise.
However, even as thus characterized, this power is further limited.
As is true of most shareholder powers, its exercise is not an individual
prerogative. And as with all decisions made by the annual meeting
(assembl6e generale ordinaire), the allocation of profits and declaration of dividends is by vote of a simple majority. 1 4 Thus, again, the
binding effect of a decision by fewer than all the shareholders is in
derogation of the minority's contractual rights, a derogation required
by practical considerations. 10 5
B. Restrictions on the Availability of DistributableFunds
While it is true that the majority is the sole repository of this power,
it is equally true that they do not have the sole interest in its exercise.
The corporation itself, as distinct from the majority, the corporation's
creditors, and the minority shareholders all have interests which may
compete with those of the majority. And so to some extent, perhaps
even to a significant extent, this majority power has been hedged
about with statutory and judicially interpolated restrictions in recognition of the competing interests involved. And it is significant that
these restrictions are not invoked under the guise of theory, but seem
to be an almost frank recognition of the competing interests involved.
The most obvious of these restrictions is implicit in the mere statement of the power itself: namely, that it is the power to allocate profits.
Since a reduction of capital requires a modification of the articles of
incorporation'06 which is within the sole competence of the special
shareholders meeting with its more stringent notice, 10 7 quorum and
voting requirements, 1 8 it is clear that a mere majority at the annual
meeting may not effect such a reduction under the guise of a dividend.
To the extent that a dividend paid is in excess of funds legally availa103. That this power pertains exclusively to the shareholders was implied in Sibourd
v. Soci~t6 Anonyme Pival, Tribunal de Commerce de la Seine, 4 March 1933, [1933]
GAz. PAL. (1st Sem.) 893, where the court held that upon the declaration of the
dividend by the shareholders the corporation became a debtor of the shareholders to
the extent of the dividend, and that while the assembl&e general could with propriety
leave the actual date of its payment to the board of directors' discretion, the board
could not in effect exercise a veto power over the declaration by delaying payment
for an unreasonable length of time.
104. Art. 28, Law of July 24, 1867, CODE DE Co NcMI.1CE art. 46, at 38 (59th ed.
Dalloz 1963).
105. Lesourd, L'Annulation pour Abus de Droit des D6librationsd'Assembl6es Genjrales, [1962] REv. Tin. DR. Comm. 1.
106. 1 Ri'ER-, TR xrs §§ 1499, 1532.
107. Special notice requirements are required for reductions of capital. See arts. 55,
56, 57(7), 59, Law of July 24, 1867, as amended, Decree Law of October 30, 1935,
CODE DE COanc.E art. 46, at 50-52 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963).
108. See pp. 727-30 supra.
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ble for such purposes, the dividend is said to be fictional, and under
certain conditions the shareholders are liable for its restitution.10 9
On the other hand the mere presence of net profits does not automatically legitimate the dividend declared by the annual meeting.
Not only does the law specify and limit the sources of dividends, but
to some extent it arrogates the allocation of these funds, or more
accurately predetermines their allocation, leaving to the shareholders
the mere formal compliance with its provisions. Thus Article 36 of the
Law of July 24, 1867110 provides that each year one-twentieth of the
net profits of the corporation must be set aside in a reserve. However,
that article also provides that such a deduction ceases to be obligatory when this required reserve has attained a size equal to one-tenth
of the corporation's capital."'
Further, the articles of incorporation themselves may provide that
the amount annually allocable to the "legal" reserve may exceed that
required by article 36, or alternately may provide for other reserves
even though these are not made mandatory by law. Such reserves,
if established, may be modified or abolished only by an amendment
to the articles of incorporation, and their requirements must be observed by the annual meeting of shareholders."12 The allocation of
profits to the reserves required by law or the articles takes precedence
over the payment of dividends.
In addition to the reserves required by law and those established
by the articles, the articles of incorporation may in other respects
indirectly predetermine the allocation of distributable profits and thus
further reduce the power of the annual meeting to make such an
allocation." 3 Article 11 of the Law of March 4, 1943, as modified by
the Decree of September 30, 1953," 4 permits the directors of a corporation to be paid a salary (tantidme), the amount of which is
determined by the annual meeting of the shareholders and required
109. 1 RJPERT, TRa=- § 1483. Although it seems correct to characterize a dividend

as "fictional" to the extent that it impairs capital, the doctrine of fictional dividends
covers a wider variety of situations than merely the extreme case of capital impairment.
1 RiPERT, TnarrE § 1482. Historically, the theory of fictional dividends seems to have

developed primarily as a limitation on the power of directors to pay a dividend previously declared by the shareholders on the strength of an income statement fraudulently
or incorrectly drawn up by the directors. NomEi, op. cit. supra note 65, at 102-09
(1958); Note, [1950] REV. Tnmr. Dii. Comm. 77.
110. CODE DE COMMERCE art. 46, at 45 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963).
111. For a criticism of this requirement see LAcomBE, op. cit. supra note 102, at
120-30.
112. BER, op. cit. supra note 50, § 255; 1 BIPERT, TAarE § 1463. For notice
requirements if the articles are amended to modify or abolish reserves that were

initially established by the articles see arts. 55, 56, 57(9), 59, Law of July 24,
1867 as amended, Decree Law of October 30, 1935, CODE DE CO-MMERcE art. 46, at

50-52 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963).
113. 1 RiPERT, TRArrE § 1473(2).
114. CODE DE CoznmRcE art. 46, at 79 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963).
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by the article to be treated as an operating expense (frais gene'raux)
on the corporation's income statement. As a result, to the extent that
such salaries are voted, the funds available for dividends are reduced.
But article 11 also provides, as an alternative to the shareholders
fixing these salaries, that they may be predetermined by the articles
of incorporation. If this latter course is followed, these salaries must
be established as a percentage of net profits," 5 not in any event to
exceed ten per cent for all directors combined." 6 Although the payment of these salaries, whether or not established by the articles of
incorporation, is subordinate to the payment of the dividends to shareholders," 7 the shareholders must allocate available net profits to these
salaries before they declare a dividend except to the extent that the
articles of incorporation specify a "fixed" dividend, or in the absence
of such specification to the extent of five per cent of the capital represented by the outstanding shares." 8 Thus, while the payment of previously declared dividends always takes priority over the payment of
directors' salaries, the directors' salaries, if established by the articles,
have priority over the shareholder allocation of profits except to the
extent of the "fixed" return on shareholder capital specified by law
or the articles.
Some corporations in order to raise needed capital have resorted to
the expedient of issuing shares that, in addition to a dividend, pay a
fixed return in the nature of interest on the capital contribution which
the shares represent." 9 Although the payment of the dividend on
such stock is contingent on earnings, the "interest" is payable irrespective of profits.120 As the interest payment is fixed by the articles of
incorporation, it is not within the competence of the annual meeting
of shareholders to disregard such a required charge against profits,
and to that extent, as is the case with fixed salaries for directors, it is
a further limitation on the power to allocate profits.
A somewhat similar limitation is presented by the issuance of socalled "founders shares." These are not shares in the normal sense
115. Article 11 defines "net profits" for the purposes of calculating director salaries,
but that definition applies only if such salaries are established by the articles. It is
interesting to note that net profits are defined by article 11, inter alia, as profits after
allocations to earned surplus (report a nouveau), thus indirectly requiring the directors
through the reduction of funds available for their salaries to bear part of the burden
of internal financing. See 1 Rt ERT, TRmATE § 1253.
116. Soci6t6 Pommery et Greno v. Dalmas de Polignac, Cour d'Appel de Paris, 15
March 1958, [1959] REc. DALLoz(j) 212.
117. Article 11, para. 8, Law of March 4, 1943, as amended, Decree of September
30, 1953, CODE DE COwNzERcE art. 46, at 79 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963).
118. Article 11, para. 4, of the Law of March 4, 1943, as amended, Decree of

September 30, 1953, CODE DE CommERCE art. 46, at 79 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963).
119. 1 R'ERwT, TEArTE § 1475 (5th ed. 1963).

120. Thenard, La Validit6 de la Clause d'Int6r~ts Fixes Payables en Cas d'absence
de Bgndfices, [1939] J. Soc. 193, 208-21.
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because the holders are not vested with normal shareholders' rights
and powers. 121 These shares do not represent a part of the corporation's capital, and hence they have no call on this capital upon the
corporation's dissolution. 22 However, a dividend may be and usually
is paid on such shares, and the amount of the dividend (expressed as
a per cent of the profits) is often established by the articles of incorporation rather than being left to shareholder discretion. 2 3
This rather summary catalogue of instances in which the allocation
of profits is preempted by law or by the articles of incorporation indicates the significant extent to which this shareholder power, in theory
sovereign, is in actuality severely eroded. 124 While it is true that the
restrictions are for the most part contained in the articles of incorporation, and therefore may be removed by an assembl6e g6n6rale
extraordinaire,this is not always the case. 125 Moreover, as has previously been pointed out, modification of the articles requires more
stringent notice, voting and quorum requirements, 126 and to that
extent provides a greater possible opportunity for the minority to
exercise control over the disposition of corporate profits, and ensures
to a greater degree the protection of competing interests.
The common feature of all of these restrictions is that they are
specific and direct limitations on the funds available for distribution
as dividends. Thus they are less restrictions on the power itself than
restrictions on that on which the power acts. Although to some extent
they protect the interests of the corporation and the interests of
creditors in the stability and continued health of the venture, they
seem to fall significantly short of fully protecting the interests of the
minority.

C. Direct Limitations on the Power To Allocate Net Profits
The power of the majority over the allocation of profits remaining
after the various reserve requirements have been met can give rise to
intense intra-shareholder conflicts. This would seem to be particularly
121. See note 87 supra.
122. Article 1, Law of January 23, 1929, CODE DE COMxiERCE art. 46, at 57-58

(59th ed. Dalloz, 1963); but see, 1 RiPERT, TRArE § 1353.

123. See Article 1, para. 2, Law of January 23, 1929, CODE DE COMMERCE art. 46,
at 58 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963); cf. 1 RIPERT, TRarE § 1353.
124. No limitation is placed on the degree to which the articles of incorporation
may predetermine the allocation of net profits. It seems clear that the articles may
arrogate this function in its entirety by stipulating the manner in which the shareholders
at the annual meeting shall allocate the profits in percentage terms. Cf. BEaR, op. cit.
supra note 50, § 255. In this situation the annual shareholders' meeting becomes a
mere rubber stamp.
125. However, as was noted previously, under certain circumstances, both creditors
and holders of founders' shares may have a veto power over any such changes. See
p. 728 supra.
126. See pp. 727-30 supra.
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true of the closely held corporation where majority shareholders may
dominate the board of directors and in addition may hold other positions in the corporation, and thus through the salaries incident to these
offices provide for themselves a secure and adequate return on their
investment without recourse to dividends. This conflict becomes
sharper when the majority, rather than declaring dividends, prefers
to realize their gain through capital appreciation and thus adheres
to a financial policy of reinvesting corporate profits. 127 In extreme
situations such majority power may be used to freeze out minority
shareholders, because the refusal to pay dividends may depress the
market price of the stock, allowing the majority to buy it up at an
advantageous price.1 28 But even short of such intentional machinations by the majority, a minority holder of a stock which does not have
a market may in effect find himself "locked into" an investment because of the majority's decision in good faith to reinvest corporate
profits.
The problem is made somewhat more acute under French law in
that board domination is not a necessary requisite for carrying out
such a policy, for the shareholder power to allocate profits necessarily
implies the power to dispose of them other than as dividends. Thus,
even though the articles of incorporation do not require that a substantial part of distributable profits be allocated to establish reserves,
the majority still has the power to set up "free reserves" (r~serves
libres) and thus divert from potential distribution the amounts desired.1 29 On the other hand, this is not to imply that there is not a
province of legitimate use of such a power. Commentators note that
since World War II there has been a marked and continuing trend
toward internal corporate financing. 130 Thus the demarcation of the
legitimate sphere of this power, and the availability of checks on its
abuse, is a matter of intense practical concern.
One doctrine that pervades the entire area of shareholder powers,
and that of commercial law in general, is the doctrine of abuse of
power. The basis of this doctrine is Article 1382 of the Civil Code.131
127. This potential conflict is not limited to the area of shareholders, but may extend
also to conflicts between shareholders on one hand and holders of founders' shares on
the other, when the latter are not accorded an interest in profits as of right by the
articles of incorporation. Since by definition a founders' share does not represent an

interest in the corporation's assets or capital, the refusal by the shareholders to declare
a dividend effectively does away with any return on the investment represented by
the founders' share. 1 RnET, TnArrE §§ 1355, 1467.

128. Cf. Note, Freezing Out Minority Shareholders, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1630 (1961).
129. 1 RBPERT, TnA= §§ 1466, 1469.
130. LACOMBE, op. cit. supra note 102, at 1; VIGnEux, LEs DROITS DES ACTIONNAlES
DANS LES SoCTri ANONYMES 59, 77-82 (1953).

131. Article 1382 provides: "Every act whatever of a person (homme) causing injury
to another, obliges the one by whose fault it occurred to make reparation to the one
injured." CODE Cnrm art. 1382 (61st ed. Dalloz 1962).
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The notion at work here is that power extends no further than its
32
abuse:1
Every prerogative, no matter how individual [its exercise] may appear, has
a collective purpose to fulfill; and from the moment when it deviates from
this purpose, even though unknowingly and without bad intention, it
133
falsifies itself and can no longer hope for the protection of the law ....

Potentially the doctrine of abuse of power represents a substantial
limitation on the majority power to allocate profits. But to a large
extent its scope seems to depend on the presuppositions that are
brought to bear on the problem. Thus, an adherent of the contractual
theory of the corporation might argue that the doctrine should be
given broad scope to strike down not only exercises of majority power
inconsistent with corporate objectives but also those that cannot be
affirmatively justified in corporate terms. This is so because under the
contractual theory lodging the power in the majority is an exception
required by practical considerations of corporate welfare in deroga-

tion of the "normar' unanimity rule, and thus arguably its exercise
can only be justified by reference to the reason underlying such a
derogation. On the other hand, the "institutionalist" might maintain
that there pertains to the majority a legitimate area for the exercise
of its explicitly accorded powers which needs no justification. Provided
this power is not abused in the positive sense, that is, provided it is
not used as a tool to achieve an otherwise illegitimate end, its exercise
requires no affirmative justification.
The arguments stated above are extreme, but they perhaps could
be said to represent the polar positions of the use of the doctrine of
abuse of power within the different conceptual frameworks. As applied to the issue of the power of the majority to allocate profits
between dividends on one hand and "free reserves" on the other, this
conceptual conflict, in a somewhat more attenuated form, is well
illustrated by the litigation in Schumann v. Anciens Etablissements

Piquard,3 4 a classic example of intra-shareholder conflict.

The Anciens Etablissements Piquard, a soci6t6 anonyme, had in

1954, sixty-eight-hundred shares of voting stock outstanding. Of this
stock four-thousand-twenty-six shares, or almost sixty per cent, were
held by three members of the board of directors. 135 During the eight
132. Note, [1960] RFv. Tn-i. DR. CoMAI. 99, 100.
133. Lesourd, L'Annulation pour Abus de Droit des Dglib~rationsd'Assemblges Ggn6rales, [1962] REv. Tium. DR. CoMMa. 1, 2 n.5.
134. Tribunal de Commerce de la Seine, May 18, 1957 (unreported), rev'd, Cour
d'Appel de Paris, February 27, 1959, [19591 J.C.P. 11175, rev'd, Cass. Comm., April
18, 1961, [1961] J.C.P. 12164.
135. The statement of facts and the holding of the trial court is taken from the
opinion of the Court d'Appel de Paris, [1959] J.C.P. 11175.
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years prior to 1954 the corporation had paid out on the average
thirteen per cent of its annual net profits as dividends, the remaining
eighty-seven per cent having been plowed back into the corporation
through various reserves and earned surplus (report a nouveau).
During the same eight-year period gross income of the corporation
had risen from twenty-six million francs to one-hundred-ninety-four
million francs, and net income had risen almost one thousand per cent.
At the 1954 annual meeting the income statement presented to the
shareholders for their approval indicated that during the prior year
the corporation had realized net profits of 15,834,729 francs. At that
meeting the majority, that is, the three inside stockholders, voted to
apportion the entire prior year's net profits to earned surplus, and to
pay out no dividend whatsoever. Eighteen minority shareholders,
Schumann among them, instituted an action in the Tribunal Commercial de la Seine to have the majority's resolution annulled. The theory
of their complaint was that the majority's action was an abuse of
power and hence void.
The lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground that since
the articles of incorporation sanctioned the conduct adopted by the
majority, that is, expressly contemplated that net profits could be
allocated by the majority to earned surplus, there could be no abuse
of power. The trial court thus seemed to sidestep the issue raised by
the parties, resting its decision instead on an interpretation of the
articles of incorporation.
The Cour d'Appel de Paris,136 however, in reversing the trial court,
based its decision squarely on the contractual theory of the corporation and its corollary that the minority had a right to the payment of
dividends. Invoking Article 1832 of the Civil Code,137 the court first
observed that: "[I]t is of the essence even of a contract of business
association that the profits (in view of the realization and division of
which the contract was concluded) should be distributed periodically ... ."131After pointing out that this reinvestment of profits

tended to depress the market price of the stock and thus not only to
deprive the minority of dividends but also to deprive them of an
opportunity of selling their stock for a fair price, the court went on
to hold:
[I]n the presence of these reserves (totaling over 40,000,000) already equal

to two and one-half times the Corporation's capital, the transfer to the
reserve . . . of the 15,834,729 frs. of net profits realized in 1954 is not
justified either by the legitimate anticipation of needs nor by the necessity
of meeting extraordinary temporary expenses; that this transfer, as most of
136. Cour d'Appel de Paris, February 28, 1959, [1959] J.C.P. 11175.
137. CoDE Civm art. 1832 (61st ed. Dalloz 1962).
138. See note 136 supra.
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the previous transfers, has no other explanation and no other purpose than
a desire to provide for the continuation and expansion of the business without recourse to a normal increase in capital which had become necessary;
abusively
that this therefore is a violation of the agreement [pacte sociale]
139
commited by the majority participating in the deliberations.

To the majority's argument that it was the intention of the parties that
the majority should exercise this power, as evidenced by the provision
in the articles of incorporation, the court summarily replied that the
grant of power contained in the articles was merely declaratory of
their legal rights, and that its exercise nonetheless required affirmative
justification either in the nature of anticipated extraordinary expenses
or unforeseen needs. 140
On appeal to the Cour de Cassation,'41 the court of last resort in
commercial cases, 42 the court, in reversing, alluded neither to the
argument that the majority's act was expressly contemplated by the
articles of incorporation, nor to the theoretical grounds on which the
court of appeals' decision was premised. Rather the court merely
rejected the conclusion that failure of the majority to pay a dividend
in this case was an abuse of power, summarily holding that there had
been no showing "that the disputed [majority] resolution was made
contrary to the general interests of the corporation and for the sole
purpose of favoring the majority at the expense of the minority
.... "l (Emphasis added.)

In so holding the court did not make explicit the theoretical basis
of its reasoning. It seems widely assumed that implicit in its decision
was a rejection of the contractual theory which had been adopted by
the court of appeals.'44 But the decision is not without its ambiguities. On one hand, it could be read as holding that the complainants merely failed to meet their burden of proof. 4 5 However, the
court's formulation of the doctrine of abuse of power differs radically
from that of the court of appeals, if in no other respect than in holding
that the complainant bears the burden of showing the existence of the
abuse. And this shift in the burden of proof is in itself significant,
139. Ibid.
140. Ibid. See also [19621 J. Soc. 194, 195. The decision of the Cour d'Appel de
Paris provoked an enormous number of commentaries, see, e.g., Note, [1959] GAZ. PAL.
(I) 255; Note, [1959] J.C.P. 11175; Note, [1959] R~c. DALLoz 354; Note, [1960]
REv. Tium. DR. Comm. 99. See also, Saint, France: Stockholder Protection, 9 Am. J.
CoMp,. L. 693, 698-700 (1960).
141. Cass. Comm., April 18, 1961, [1961] J.C.P. 12164.
142. 1 DAvID, LE Dnorr FRANCAiS 38-39 (1960).
143. Cass. Comm., 18 April 1961, [1961] J.C.P. 12164.
144. Autesserre, Du Report a Nouveau et de lAuto-financement des Soci6t~s, [1962]
REvuE DFS Socm'vEs 1, 12.
145. Cf. Note, [1962] J. Soc. 194, 195. This view seems to have been rejected, see,
e.g., Autesserre, Du Report i! Nouveau et de l'Auto-flnancement des Socigtis, [1962]
REvUE DES SocIr's 1, 11.
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for as was pointed out previously, 146 to assume presumptively that the
majority did not abuse their power suggests no less than that this
power is inherent to the institution that is the majority. The court of
appeals, on the other hand, regarding the majority power as an exception to the rule of unanimity, required those who seek shelter
behind this exception to legitimate their use of this power. On the
other hand to call the result achieved by the Cour d'Appel a manifestation of a contractual analysis is somewhat ironic, for the practical
effect of the decision was an intervention by the court into corporate
affairs in the name of protecting minority interests. Implicit in such
a result would seem to be the rejection of the contractual theory
which assumes that the minority can adequately protect itself through
its freedom to contract.
It is difficult to tie the decisions in Schumann to any conceptual
theories. It may be equally difficult to see why it is necessary to so
buttress any given conclusion. As one French commentator has pointed out, "the role of the courts, in each particular case, is to determine
the point of equilibrium, to effect a conciliation between the corporate
interests and the personal interests of shareholders .... " 141 Surely this
is the position that Anglo-American law would take: an analysis of
the interests at stake, and to effect a conciliation between them. But
for the civil lawyer such a route is perhaps open to question. On one
hand the courts may not refuse to decide a case because of the difficulty of the legal problem involved or the absence of law on an
issue. 148 On the other hand 'law" to the civil lawyer means statutory
law, the provisions of the Civil and Commercial Codes. To engage in
the process of weighing the interests present in the particular case,
while a familiar example of interstitial legislation to the common
law, 149 may for a French court be regarded as an unwarranted assumption of legislative power 1 0 Thus there is arguably a need to resort
to the theory underlying the law in order to justify a decision in
those difficult cases not expressly covered by one or more provisions
of the Commercial or Civil Codes, if one's premise is that the courts
have no power to create law.
Whatever the theoretical position of the Cour de Cassation, it seems
clear that the doctrine of abuse of power will at best be only a limited
check on the majority's power to allocate profits. Not only must the
146. See pp. 736-37 supra.
147. Note, [1960] REV. Tmi. Dn. CoMm. 99, 100.

148. CoDE CIVIL art. 4 (61st ed. Dalloz 1962).
149. CAB)ozo, THE NATURE OF THE JuDmCAL PRocEss 112-15 (1960 ed.).

150. Compare CODE CIVIL art. 4 (61st ed. Dalloz 1962), with CODM CIViL art, 1
(5th ed. Rossel 1962) (Swiss).
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minority show that the majority's action was contrary to the general
interests of the corporation but also that the purpose behind the exercise of this power was solely to favor the majority at the expense
of the minority. 151 In effect this is to hold that the minority has no
absolute right to corporate profits, 152 and that the majority's disposition
of these profits will be struck down only if it is shown that the real
purpose of the majority action was not only to exercise a prerogative,
even if its exercise was capricious, but that the prerogative was used
as a tool to deprive the minority of some other individual right which
the law recognizes, such as the right to continue as a shareholder and
153
not to be frozen out.
IV.

SHABEHOLDER POWER TO

REMOVE

DnuEcTORs

The process of gradual erosion of shareholder powers by statutory
and decisional law has not carried over into the area of the shareholder power to remove directors. The Commercial Code contains
but two references to the tenure of a director of a societ6 anonyme.
Article 25 of the Law of July 24, 1867154 provides that directors may
be elected for a term not exceeding six years, and may be re-elected
for an indefinite number of similar terms unless the articles of incorporation otherwise provide. In addition, article 25 accords the sole
competence to elect directors to the assemblde g6n~rale of shareholders, at which shareholder action is taken by a simple majority
55
vote.

1

The remaining reference to director tenure is contained in Article 22
of the Law of July 24, 1867, which provides: "Socigt~s anonymes are
administered by one or more agents (mandataires) chosen from
among the shareholders, appointed for a term certain, liable to dismissal, with or without salary." 156 This provision has remained vir151. See also Consort Pillier v. Soci6t6 Chauvin et Arnoux, Cass. Civ., January 20,
1958, [1958] REVUE DE S SocIns 285, 288, where it was held that the majority did not
abuse its power in setting up reserves in excess of those required by law, in that this
was not forbidden by the Articles and that "the decision appealed had certified that
the corporation was, thanks to the management of its Prdsident-directeurg~nral, in an
enviable financial condition that the dividends fixed by the assemble g6n~ral followed
a perceptible and reasonable progression . . . becoming even substantial, and that it
was not shown that the Prdsident-directeur g~n4ral had followed a policy of forcing
down [the market price] of the shares for personal ends, as the face value of the shares
rose from 1000 to 50,000 francs .. "
152. 1 RiPmT, Tmaus= § 1221; Autesserre, De la Lic~ite de la Libre Constitution des
Reserves par les Societ&, [1960] REvUE DES Socr-rEs 1, 5.
153. BERa, op. cit. supra note 50, §§ 367-70; 1 BIPERT, TRA= §§ 1123, 1170, 1202,
1496.
154. CODE DE COMmmCE art. 46, at 36-37 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963).
155. CODE DE COmECE art. 46, at 36-37 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963).
156. CODE DE COMMMRCE art. 46, at 35 (59th ed. Dalloz 1963).
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tually unchanged since 1807.157 As a result the developments that

have occurred in this area are exclusively decisional.
A. The Scope of the Power Defined Through Agency Doctrine

Although article 22 clearly provides that directors may be removed,
it does not specify on its face the grounds, if any, for which they may

be removed, nor by whom this removal power may be exercised. The
courts filled this apparent gap in the statute by reference to the civil
law concept of agent (mandataire), which the draftsmen of article 22

adopted to describe the status of a director. 158

Thus Article 2003 of the Civil Code provides that the agency may

be terminated, inter alia, by revocation by the principal, 15 9 that is the
shareholders who appointed him. Article 2004 stipulates that "The

principal may revoke the agency whenever he wishes (quand bon lui
semble) . . . ." Against this background, the Cour de Cassation in
1868, one year after the passage of article 22, categorically refused
to award damages to a director who had been dismissed without

cause by the shareholders prior to the expiration of his elected term,
holding that "[TIn revoking the agency . . . without waiting for the

expiration of the term which had been assigned to him, the shareholders meeting in an assembl6e gen~ral did no more than exercise
a power inherent in the very nature of the contract between them
and their agent . . . ."160 (Emphasis added.) It is to be noted that
the court made no mention in its decision of articles 2003 and 2004.
But the court throughout speaks of agents rather than directors, and
the application of these Civil Code sections is thus implied. In short,
in view of these statutory provisions no other decision was open to
them.

16 1

Although the courts have on the one hand accepted the agency
157. Compare CODE DE CommERcE

art. 31

(Official

ed. 1807):

"[The

societe

anonyme] is administered by agents appointed for a term certain, liable to dismissal,
with or without salary," with art. 22, Law of July 24, 1867, CODE DE CoammcE at 105
(Dalloz ed. 1877): "socit&s anonymes are administered by one or more agents chosen
from among the shareholders, appointed for a term certain with or without salary."
158. The process of interpretation used by the courts in this instance illustrates well
the manner by which legislative gaps in the Commercial Code are filled by reference to
the "common law" of the Civil Code, and serves to point up the fact that the Commercial Code in general and French corporation law in particular, are not autonomous
bodies of law and cannot be construed in vacuo.
159. "The agency is terminated: by the revocation of the principal, by the renunciation of the agency by the agent, by natural or civil death, the insolvency or the deprivation [of civil rights] of either the principal or agent." CODE CIVIL art. 2003 (61st ed.
Dalloz 1962).
160. Heusschen v. Soci6t6 Financi&e d'Egypt, Cass. Civ., July 28, 1868, [1868]
Bulletin des arrets de la court de Cassation 203 (No. 136) [hereinafter cited as Bull.
Cass.].
161. Autesserre, Nature Jurisdique et Condition de Revocation des G~rants de
Soci~t6 et Notament de Ceux des Soci6t.s d ResponsabilitM Limit e, [1957] Rmvutr
DES SocmrEs 256, 257.
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doctrine to clarify the extent and locus of the removal power accorded
by article 22, they have on the other hand extended this power
beyond that normally accorded a principal under the Civil Code.
Thus while it is true that under article 2003 the principal may dismiss
the agent without cause, it is likewise true that the agency agreement may in certain cases provide otherwise. 62 However, in dealing
with the propriety of restrictions on the removal power in the articles,
while the Cour de Cassation initially seemed to hesitate, 163 in Caisse
Mdridionale v. Mercaillou-LUpine64 it held that a director dismissed
without cause did not have a cause of action against the corporation
for damages, notwithstanding the fact that the articles of incorporation expressly stipulated that the director could only be dismissed for
serious misdeeds. The court based its holding squarely on the proposition that such clauses in derogation of the shareholder power to remove were contrary to public policy and hence void. Similarly, in
Delmas v. Paindavoine,65 the court held a provision in the articles of
incorporation allowing liquidated damages of fifty-thousand francs
to a named director should he be dismissed without cause prior to
the end of his elected term contrary to public policy, and somewhat
apologetically pointed out that should such a provision be allowed
to stand its use could become widespread and would furnish a too
simple means of evading the law. Despite criticism of this expansive
interpretation of article 22,'6 the Cour de Cassation has adhered to
67
its original view without any sign of deviation.
It seems rather difficult to account for the expansiveness of the
court's interpretation of article 22, and there is little or no discussion
by commentators or by the court itself of the rationale underlying it.
While initially such an interpretation may have been justified by a
concern to protect shareholders against the predatory practices of
directors, 16 such a concern seems somewhat misplaced in an era
that recognized the widest of shareholder powers. However, today
162. 3 RlPEnT & BOULANGOE.,
TRArrE DE DROrT CiviL §§ 2161, 2165 (1958); 1
RPERT, TRArrE § 1266; 3 ENCYCLOPEDiE DAL.OZ, Administrateur § 94 (1958).
163. See Heussehen v. Soci6t6 Financi6re d'Egypt, Cass. Civ., July 28, 1868 [1868]
Bull. Cass. 203, holding that on the assumption that shareholders may limit their power
to remove directors by means of a suitable provision in the articles of incorporation,
such a curtailment of shareholder power may not be implied but must be expressly
stated.
164. Cass. Civ., April 30, 1878 [1878] REc. DALLOZ (I) 314.
165. Cass. Civ., March 17, 1893, [1893] REc. DALLOZ (II) 309.
166. 1 RiPERT, Tanrr § 1266.
167. See, e.g., Soci6t6 nouvelle des Establissements Alfred Maguin v. Maguin, Cass.
Civ., May 23, 1944, [1944] REC. DALLOZ (J) 105; 3 ENCYCLOPEDM DALLOZ, Administrateur § 94 (1958).
168. See Soci6t6 anonyme de blanchiment v. Kastner, Cour d'Appel de Paris, December 13, 1883, [1885] REc. DALLOZ (II) 8, 9 where it was noted that the removal power
was the "safeguard of the interests of the shareholders."
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when169such powers are severely curtailed it may have found justification; but even so the requirement of cause would seem to be a
sufficiently potent weapon to check abuses, and it is not inconsistent
with article 22 when it is read against the more permissive agency
doctrines of the Civil Code.
Another possible rationale for the interpretation given article 22
may have been the reluctance of the courts to involve themselves in
intra-corporate power struggles, or alternately that the concept, of
cause was not susceptible of judicial accommodation. This latter
view seems unacceptable in the light of Article 24 of the Law of
March 7, 1925 which provides that directors of an S.A.R.L. may be
dismissed only with cause, and, a fortiori, leaves the issue of cause
to the determination of the courts. Similarly in the case of the
societe anonyme itself the commissaires aux comptes are not freely
170
removable, a requirement somewhat akin to cause being required.
Whatever may be said for the consistency of the court's position, it
ignores to a great extent both the interests of the corporation in the
stability of its management and the interests of the directors in the
certainty of their tenure. 171
B. Attempts To Circumvent the Expansive Interpretation of
the Removal Power
It is indeed the interests of the corporation and its directors in
stability which gave rise in the first place to the attempts to circumvent the court's expansive interpretation of article 22. In addition
to provisions in the articles of incorporation directly or indirectly
limiting the removal power, several other devices have been used in
the attempt to modify the rigors of the court's position. Initially
this was done by means of an agreement outside the articles of incorporation between one or more of the shareholders and the director,
which provided that in the event of dismissal or dismissal without
cause, the director would be indemnified. But consistently, the court
in Fighiera v. Mine172 found such an agreement, even though executed outside the ambit of the articles, to be contrary to public policy
and hence void. On the other hand, in Chalamon v. Combier73 the
court mitigated the rigors of the Fighieradecision somewhat by holding that even though a court could not validate an agreement to award
damages upon dismissal, it could require the directors (even absent
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Cf. NomL, op. cit. supra note 65, at 82.
2 MoLrmuc, MANuErL DFs SocmTvs § 1175 (1959); 1 Rn'EnT,
See NomEL, op. cit. supra note 65, at 182.
Cass Civ., January 10, 1881, [1881] REc. DALLOZ (I) 161.
Cass. (ch. Req.), June 2, 1924, [1925] J. Soc. 154.

TnAITE §

1296.
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such an agreement) who conspired out of malice to secure the removal of their colleague to pay damages to the ousted director, when
he was removed in a manner that precluded him from adequately
defending himself against the charges leveled at him. However, in
Societ6 de la Manufacture moderne de lits v. Henno,7 4 the Cour de
Cassation, although admitting that an ousted director could sue the
corporationfor damages if he could show that his removal constituted
an abuse of power, denied recovery on the ground that a mere showing of intent to prejudice or compromise (nuire) the ousted director,
absent other allegations, was insufficient in law to establish an abuse
of power. While it may be true that the court in the Henno case
treats the doctrine of abuse of power rather restrictively, 17 5 the decision is significant in that it is explicit in its recognition of the director's
interest.
A somewhat more successful device to circumvent the expansive interpretation of article 22, has been to secure the tenure of the director
by means of an independent employment contract. Thus, although
the director, qua director may be dismissed without cause, his employment, usually as a directeur technique,17 6 secured by contract,
assures him either of a continuing salary or damages in the event
7
that he is also dismissed in this latter capacity without cause.1
While it was held that there was no inherent conflict between the
78
duties of a director and that of an employee or directeurtechnique
Article 2 of the Law of November 16, 1940, as modified by the Law
of March 4, 1943, provides: "No member of the board of directors,
other than the president, the director receiving the delegation in the
cases anticipated in paragraphs 4 and 5 below, and the director
chosen as directeur gengral, may be granted the functions of management (direction) in the corporation." This law was interpreted by
some theorists as prohibiting any director from assuming any other
office within the corporation except those expressly permitted by the
article,' 9 and, a fortiori, prohibiting a director from assuming the
174. Cass. Comm., July 12, 1955, [1955] Bull. Cass. (pt. 3) 214.
175. NomrEL, op. cit. supra note 65, at 183-84.
176. "The directeur technique in contrast to a directeur g~n~ral is a superior
employee bound to the corporation by a contract of personal services. Normally his
role is reduced to the organization and supervision of a particular department of the
business (manufacture, administration, sales, public relations, etc.). Even though he
is not prohibited [by law] from binding the corporation or signing contracts, this type
of activity should be reduced to the greatest possible extent." 2 MoLmRAc, MANUEL
DES Soc=TEs § 1168 (1959).
177. Bmu op. cit. supra note 50, § 637; 1 Bn, aiT, TRAT § 1267.
178. Soci6t6 anonyme des Etablissements Victor Weibel v. Weibel, Cass. (ch. Req.),
June 13, 1936, [1938] REC. DALoz (I) 93, 96.
179. NomEL, op. cit. supra note 65 at 191-92.
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180
position of directeur technique. And at least one lower court,
implicitly regarding the law as an embodiment of the German con-

cept of Filhrerprinzip,181 held that it was inconsistent for even the

directeur general to assume at the same time any other subordinate
Thus
position. Both of these interpretations were generally rejected.
83 could
182
genera'
directeur
a
and
it was held that both a director
simultaneously hold a position as directeur technique providing that
the contract of personal services under which the latter position was

assumed had an independent purpose (serieux) and was not entered

into merely to provide indemnification should he be dismissed from
his position as director. 184 Moreover, the question whether such a
185
contract had an independent purpose was one for the courts,' and in
determining its validity the courts look behind its form to determine
the intention of the contracting parties. 186
In thus interpreting Article 2 of the Law of November 16, 1940, as
modified by the Law of March 4, 1943, the courts distinguished between general management (direction gne'ral) which was prohibited

to others than those enumerated in the law, and mere administration
of a technical nature, which was regarded as outside the scope of its

prohibition. Thus, if the contract sued on was interpreted by the
court as not in fact being a contract of employment under which the

director-employee assumed merely administrative and technical func-

tions, but rather granted him essentially managerial powers, then the
180. Miermont v. Etablissement J.A.C. et L'Urbaine et la Seine, Cour d'Appel do
Lyon, December 10, 1948, [1950] J.C.P. (II) 5457; VERNON, LE PRESIDENT-DmEcTEuR
GENERAL DANS LES SocIETEs ANONYMES 55-57 (2d ed. 1958).
181. See Note, [1962] REvuE DES SociETEs 54. For the German influence on the
Law of November 16, 1940, see BAuDoiN-BUGNET & CozARD, LA DmIcrIoN DES
Socmr-Es PAR AcTIoN Er FRA cE ET ALLEmAcNE (1941).

182. Lalieu v. de Langre, Cass. Civ., February 9, 1950, [1950] Bull. Cass. (pt. 3)
100 (No. 145); Vve. Galaup v. X, Cour d'Appel de Paris, July 25, 1947, [1948] J.C.P.
(II) 4110; Soci6t6 anonyme Papeterie de La Haye Descartes v. Carlot, Cour d'Appel
de Paris, November 2, 1961, [1962] GAZ. PAL. (I) 77; Tourres v. Soci6t6 anonyme
des Verreries de Graville, Cass. Comm., July 6, 1961, [1961] Bull. Cass. (pt. 3) 276
(No. 318); but cf. Allut v. Soci6t6 Digonnet Tribunal de Commerce de Lyon, April
13, 1951, [1951] REc. DALLOZ (J) 678 (directeur administratif may not also be a
director, and as the assumption of latter position by a directeur administratif was void
his tenure in the former position was valid).
183. Soci6t6 Cinema Tirage L. Maurice v. Gratioulet, Cass. Comm., February 25,
1957, [1957] J.C.P. (II) 10019; Soci6t6 le Batiment v. Secade, Cour d'Appel d'Alger,
20 April 1950, [1950] lEc. DALLOZ (J) 777; Note, [1962] REvuE DES Socm-rEs 54-55.
184. For an exposition of the factors that are taken into account in ascertaining
whether the contract in dispute has an independent purpose, see, Compagnie d'applications industrielles de recherches et d'etudes v. Venturini, Cour d'Appel de Paris June
13, 1961, [1962] REvuE DEs SocmirEs 54; NOmEL, op. cit. supra note 65, at 196-98
(1958).
185. See note 182 supra.
186. Soci6t6 anonyme Papeterie de La Haye Descartes v. Garlot, Cour d'Appel de
Paris, November 2, 1961, [1962] GAz. PAL. (I) 77.
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contract was void because within the prohibition of article 2.187 On
the other hand, even if it was found that the contract was one under
which the director-employee assumed merely administrative and technical functions, though it was now outside the prohibition of article 2,
it could still be regarded as voidable if it had no independent purpose,
that is, if its true purpose was merely to circumvent the possibility of
his removal under Article 22 of the Law of July 24, 1867. Therefore,
while recognizing the interests of the corporation in employing from
day to day the technical knowledge of its directors to the greatest
possible extent,'8 8 the courts simultaneously affirmed their intention
of protecting the interests of the shareholder by assuring that no inroads were made on their removal power. Thus, at best, the courts'
position provided cold comfort to those directors who saw in employment contracts an opportunity for evading the expansive interpretation which had been given Article 22 of the Law of July 24, 1867.
From the above analysis it seems abundantly clear that the paramount interest of both the statutory and decisional law relating to the
removal power of shareholders is the protection of those shareholders,
or more accurately, the majority. To a lesser extent, particularly in
the courts' treatment of plural positions for directors, the interests of
the corporation are considered-at least insofar as the corporation has
an interest in the maximum utilization of the available technical talent
of its directors. 18 9 However, the substantive law does not seem to
accord any weight to the interests of the corporation in the continuity
or stability of its board of directors; nor, except incidentally in the
application of the rather limited doctrine of abuse of power, has the
interest of the director in the security of his tenure been recognized.
C. The ProceduralContext in Which the Removal Power is
Exercised
To a limited extent, however, this imbalance in the concerns of the
substantive law has been redressed by the courts' consideration of the
procedural context in which this removal power is exercised by the
shareholders. As was mentioned previously, 190 the forum in which the
shareholders exercise this power is the assemble general ordinaire or
assemblde g~nral ordinaire tenue extraordinairement.In order to
validly pass a resolution dismissing a director, the shareholders meeting must have been properly constituted, that is, it must have been
187. See, e.g., Compagnie d'applications industrielles de recherches et d'etudes v.

Venturini, Cour d'Appel de Paris, June 13, 1961, [1962] REVUE DES SocrtEs 54.

188. NonIEL, op. cit. supra note 65, at 190.
189. But see, Note, [1962]

REVUE DES

SocIres 54, 61, where it is pointed out that

article 764 of the proposed draft of the new Commercial Code prohibits without exception all employment contracts between directors and the corporation.
190. See note 62 supra.
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convened by the proper authority, 191 and the quorum requirements

specified in Article 30 of the Law of July 24, 1867, as amended by the
192 In addition, a
Law of February 25, 1953, must have been met.

shareholders meeting otherwise validly constituted may legally act
only on those matters incorporated in its agenda (ordre du jour) for

that meeting. 193 Finally, even though all other conditions are met in
order to be valid, the resolution must have been passed by the majority vote as specified in Article 28 of the Law of July 24, 1867 or the
14
articles of incorporation, if the latter imposes a higher requirement.

This power of the board of directors over the matters to be included

on the agenda of the shareholders meeting, together with the power

to decide whether or not to call such a meeting (except the annual
meeting) in the first instance, clearly could be used as a weapon to
neutralize or at least reduce the effective exercise of the shareholders'
removal power. Should the shareholders desire to remove a hostile
board of directors, for example, or merely one of their number, this
action could be entirely prevented by the directors' refusal to schedule such a proposal on the agenda. Similarly, even if the entire board
a majority of the board present could block such
is not hostile,
5
action.

19

The decided cases indicate that such attempts on the part of the
191. The proper convening authority is normally the board of directors. But see
art. 27 of the Law of July 24, 1867, CODE DE CoManmc

art. 46, at 37 (59th ed.

Dalloz 1963), which makes the annual meeting (assemblde genral ordinaire) mandatory. See also p. 749 infra for the power of the commissaires aux comptes to call a
meeting in certain circumstances.
192. Quorum requirements imposed by law may not be raised by provisions in the
articles of incorporation. BEan, op. cit. supra note 50, § 321; 1 RIPERT, TnArrE § 1181.
However, if the first assembl&e g~n~rale ordinaire called fails to meet or achieve
the statutory quorum of the number of shares representing one-fourth of the
corporation's capital, a second such meeting may be called at which no quorum
requirement whatever is imposed. Art. 30, Law of July 24, 1867, as amended, art. 9
of the Law of February 25, 1953, CODE DE CoMxrrmcE art. 46 at 39 (59th ed. Dalloz
1963).
193. 1 BIPERT, TRArrE § 1190. However, certain questions, not here relevant, are
exempted from this requirement.
194. In DeSaint-Genieys v. Soci6t6 d'assurances l'Afrique Francaise, Cass. Civ., July
5, 1893, [1894] BE. DALLoz (I) 41, the Cour de Cassation seems to have held that
the articles of incorporation could provide a higher voting requirement than was required by law in the case of an assembl&e g~ndral called to act upon a director's dismissal. This decision, which is not without its ambiguities, seems inconsistent with the
court's expansive interpretation of article 22 of the Law of July 24, 1867, although it
does not appear to have been subsequently overruled.

3 ENCYCLOPEDIA DALLOZ,

Administrateur§ 98 (1958).
195. See generally, BER, op. cit. supra note 50, §§ 529-35. It is to be noted that
no quorum requirements are imposed by law on the meetings of the board of directors
of a socidt6 anonyme. 1 BiPERT, TBArr= § 1248. However, it is likely that in most
cases the articles of incorporation impose such a quorum requirement. See, e.g., 2
MOLIEAC, MANUEL DES SocmrEs 662 (1959),

where article 26 of the "form"

articles of incorporation provide for a quorum requirement for board meetings.
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board of directors have been freely resorted to; and while the courts
appear unwilling, or in the face of these statutory powers unable, to
prevent the possibility of such abuses, they have been quick to reassert, whenever possible, the full and effective use of the shareholders' removal power. 196
Although the power to call a shareholders meeting (except the
annual meeting) is discretionary with the board of directors, Article
32 of the Law of July 24, 1867, as amended by Article 4 of the DecreeLaw of August 8, 1935, gives the commissaire aux comptes the concurrent power to convoke such a general meeting in cases of urgency.
In Quarrd v. Societ' des Etablissements Fouga et Cie,197 it was held
that dissension among the members of the board which threatened
the orderly functioning of the corporation, was in itself a situation of
sufficient urgency to vest the commissaire aux comptes with the power
to call a meeting to discuss the dismissal of certain of the directors.
However, the court, in so holding, was careful to point out that the
possibility of harm to the corporation was coupled with a finding by
the commissaire that the intra-corporate dissension would have prevented the board calling the normal annual meeting.
Somewhat more vexing is the question whether shareholder action
dismissing a director is valid absent specification of such a resolution
on the agenda of the meeting. This issue has involved two distinct
lines of inquiry by the courts: first, whether such action is valid
under any conditions absent such specification; and second, whether
the question or resolution placed on the agenda may be said to be
made with sufficient specificity to raise the issue of removal.
With respect to the first line of inquiry, two judicially interpolated
exceptions have been engrafted on to the rule that the question of
removal must appear on the face of the agenda of the shareholders
meeting. The first of these is simply that since this notice requirement is not a matter of public policy it may be derogated from by
the articles of incorporation. 98 The second and more important exception is that the question of dismissal need not be on the agenda if
the dismissal is necessary "because of unforeseen incidents taking
196. NomEL, op. cit. supra note 64, at 185-89. But see BREE, op. cit. supra note 50,
§ 636, treating the decisions in this area as an indirect attenuation of the removal power.
In Soci6t6 anonyme des Tubes de Solesmes v. Arbez, Cass. Civ., March 11, 1936,
[1936] GAz. PAL. (I) 838, the court said: "[11f

...

an assemble g~ndral . . . of a

socihtd anonyme has the sovereign power to dismiss and replace a director, it pertains,
on the other hand to the courts to verify the regularity of the conditions in which the
meeting was called and its decision .... "
197. Cour de Montpellier, January 29, 1937, [1939] J. Soc. 93.
198. Soci6t6 anonyme des Eaux de Vals v. Combier, Cass. (ch. Req.), June 2,
1924, [1925] J. Soc. 153; Hennion v. Dunet, Cass. Civ., 15 July 1895, [1895] GAZ.
PAL. (II)

368, 370 (socitd en commandites par actions). See, 2 MoraaMAc, MANUEL

SocmTEs 669-70, for a typical form articles of incorporation expressly prohibiting
the shareholders from passing on any question not proposed on the agenda.
DES
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place during the course of the meeting which demand immediate
solution .... 199 Thus while the rationale of the general requirement
that the issue be on the agenda is said to be that fairness requires
that notice be given when the dismissal of a director is contemplated,200 an exception quite properly is made in those cases where
the need for immediate dismissal does not come to the attention of
the shareholders prior to the meeting and the corporation's well-being
201
urgently demands that delay in dismissing the director be avoided.
But in engrafting on to the rule this exception known as the doctrine of incidents de seance, it was given a rather limited application
so that the basic rule of fairness would not itself be completely
vitiated.20 2 While it is patently clear, for example, that the shareholders may in the normal course remove a director without any
cause whatever, when removal is sought without the question having
previously been placed on the agenda, such removal may be achieved
only if there is cause which would warrant the extraordinary action
and therefore legitimate the need for the exception to the basic rule of
fairness. Thus in Mure et de Bearn v. Olry-Roederer,2 3 when the
director, during the course of an annual meeting, refused to answer
questions posed by a shareholder concerning his clear misuse of
corporate funds which came to light during the meeting, the court
first held that this action of the director during the meeting was
sufficient to give the shareholders the right to consider the question
whether grounds for his dismissal existed, even though this question
had not been scheduled on the agenda for that meeting. The court
then held that the allegations of misuse of funds, shown to be true,
were sufficient cause to validate the dismissal. The Olry-Roederer
case illustrates that while upon the director's refusal the issue of dismissal was properly before the shareholders, the ultimate question of
the propriety of the dismissal turns on whether the charges leveled
at the director or the malfeasance of the director revealed at the
meeting2° were sufficiently serious20 5 and of such a nature 2 6 as to
199. Soci6t6 anonymes des Tubes de Solesmes v. Arbez, Cass. Civ., March 11, 1936,
[1936] GAz. PAL. (I) 838.
200. "[T~he directors benefit from this procedural safeguard [that the issue of
" NOItLL,
dismissal be on the agenda] which permits them to prepare their defense ..
op. cit. supra note 65, at 188 (1958); BEim, op. cit. supra note 50, § 532; ef. 2
MoLIEMAc, MANUEL DES SOCMTEs § 1099 (1959). There is little discussion of the
rationale behind this rule. See pp. 752-53 infra.
201. NOmEL, op. cit. supra note 65, at 188.
202. Id. at 186-87.
203. Cour d'Appel de Paris, July 19, 1935, [193] REc. DALLOZ 561.
204. But see, NomEL, op. cit. supra note 65, at 187 (1958).
205. Regnauld v. Bontemps, Tribunal de Commerce de ]a Seine, July 30, 1948,
[1948] GAz. PAL. (II) 117.
206. Jeandidier-Wagner v. Brasserie Wagner, Cour d'Appel de Besancon, November
3, 1954, [1955] J.C.P. (II) 8750. For a criticism of this requirement of "immediacy"
or "urgency" see NOmEL, op. cit. supra note 65, at 188 (1958).
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require and justify the peremptory action of the shareholders. Thus
it is clear that the mere refusal of the director in Olry-Roederer was
not the cause that warranted the dismissal. Further the refusal together with the allegations gave the shareholders the right to consider whether the allegations were true.
On the other hand, as the Olry-Roederer decision also indicates,
the courts have not left to the shareholders the ultimate questions of
whether the requirements of "cause" and "urgency" have been met in
any particular situation. In affirming the propriety of such shareholder
action in Socit6 anonyme des Tubes de Solesmes v. Arbez,2 0 7 the Cour
de Cassation pointed out that the presence and sufficiency of both
these requirements were not only matters for the courts, but also that
they were issues of fact within the sole competence of the court of
28
first instance and not reviewable on appeal.
Finally, the shareholders must be able to show that the charges
revealed or actions that took place during the course of the meeting
were causally related to the dismissal. This factor of causal relation
was crucial in Jeandidier Wagner v. Brasserie Wagner,2 9 where the
trial court annulled the resolution of the shareholders dismissing two
directors when it was shown that the reason for the dismissal was not
their alleged misconduct which was revealed during the meeting, but
rather was their mere refusal to resign when requested by the majority
stockholder. The court felt compelled to this conclusion because of
conduct on the part of the shareholders inconsistent with their assertions that the reason for the dismissal was the directors' malfeasance,
in that after the dismissal the shareholders approved the balance sheet
and income statement drawn up by the directors and, in addition,
passed a resolution approving of their actions in office which was in
effect a shareholder ratification of their conduct during office.
The above analysis of the case law seems to suggest that while
the courts have not enlarged the exception to the basic agenda
requirement beyond the point necessary to accommodate the interests of the shareholders and the corporation, respectively, they have
also manifested some concern with the interests of the director in
defending himself when he is dismissed without prior notice, by
assessing the regularity of the procedural context in which this shareholder power is exercised.2 10 This they have done by allowing this
defense to be presented to and passed upon by the courts when the
director raises the question of the legality of the shareholder action
207.
208.
among
209.
210.

Cass. Civ., March 11, 1936, [1936] GAz. PAL. (I) 838.
The fact that such decisions are not reviewable has led to some inconsistency
trial courts as to what facts satisfy these legal criteria.
See note 206 supra.
See note 200 supra.
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before them. Further analysis leads one to question such a premise,
and indicates that in allowing judicial review of the action of the
majority of the shareholders, the concern is not with the interest of the
director but rather is with the interests of the shareholders whom that
director represents.
If the exception to the agenda requirement is designed to protect
the director's interest, how does one reconcile that concern with its
total absence when the shareholders follow the proper procedural
pattern? Since the shareholders, as a primary matter, have the unqualified right to dismiss a director without cause if the proper procedure is followed, implicit in such a right is the determination that
the director has no interest in his defense of which the law will take
cognizance, since nothing that the director can say modifies the absolute right of the shareholders to dismiss him. And since initially when
there is advance notice, that is, when the question of dismissal is put
on the agenda, the director has no legally cognizable interest in his
defense, how does he gain such an interest merely because such
advance notice is not given?
On the other hand, the shareholders whom the dismissed director
represents do have an interest in his tenure and hence in the continued representation of their interests on the board of directors.
When advance notice of the impending dismissal is given by placing
the issue on the agenda, this shareholder interest is protected because
the shareholders whom the director represents are forewarned that
they must appear at the meeting and vote against his dismissal or else
forego the continued representation of their interests. But absent such
a requirement of notice, no such protection is afforded. Therefore, a
dismissal without notice requires cause, which, when litigated in the
courts, assures the shareholders supporting the ousted director that if
their interest is legitimate, if it is not detrimental to the interests of
the corporation as a whole as indicated by the presence of the
requisite cause, it will be protected by the director's reinstatement.
However appealing, it must be admitted that this analysis is conjectural; and we are properly admonished that "American lawyers
must necessarily walk gingerly in the glades of the Civil Law."2 11 The
courts in dealing even with these judicially interpolated doctrines infrequently indulge in any discussion of their rationales. And what
discussion is present in secondary authorities, although ambiguous,
does seem to point to the contrary conclusion that the director's interest is here at stake.212 This issue is further confused because the
courts, although they may be furthering the interest of the share211. Conway v. Silesian-American Corp., 186 F.2d 201, 214 (2d Cir. 1950) (Clark,

J.), cited in Vagts, Book Review, 75 HAuv. L. REv. 1046, 1049 (1962).
212. See note 200 supra.
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holders when they require that either the question of dismissal be put
on the agenda or cause for dismissal be shown, recognize this interest
only upon the institution of suit by the director-not by the shareholders. This of course is not in itself inconsistent with the rationale
suggested if the remedy the court awards is reinstatement, since the
director may be regarded as the most convenient medium to promote
the shareholder interests. In addition, he may be the party best situated to lay proof of the absence of cause before the courts. Finally, as
a practical matter, if the shareholders-in most cases a minority group
-were regarded as the sole party at interest, their lack of cohesiveness, or even, if the individual shareholding was small, their lack of
interest would, in effect, be tantamount to condoning majority abuses.
On the other hand, the inconsistency becomes more apparent when
the courts award damages to the ousted director in addition to ordering his reinstatement, or alternately do not reinstate at all but merely
award damages. 213 In the latter situation it can be argued that no
interest of the shareholders whatever is forwarded, but rather that all
the shareholders are harmed by the imposition of damages on the
corporation-which ultimately will reduce the shareholders' equity in
the corporation. But such a conclusion may be somewhat partial.
While it is true that the imposition of damages on the corporation
may be a rather awkward way to achieve the desired end, at least it
will have a cautionary effect, and would tend to impel the corporation
or the shareholders seeking the director's dismissal to observe the
agenda requirement. In short, damages may be a high price to pay
for short-run control.
That the interests sought to be protected by the agenda requirement, or its alternative cause, is that of the shareholders, rather than
the director whose dismissal is sought, is suggested by yet another
procedural obstacle that may be raised to challenge the validity of a
dismissal: namely, that the question placed on the agenda is not
sufficiently specific to give fair warning of the intended action. Typical of this latter situation is Soci~te anonyme des Eaux de Vals v.
Combier, 14 where a director attacked his dismissal on the ground that
the issue of his dismissal was not properly raised for shareholder consideration by the mention in the agenda of "modification a apporter
a la composition du conseil dadministration." The court, in upholding the director and voiding the shareholders resolution dismissing
him, was at pains to point out that not only had the agenda not been
brought to the attention of the shareholdersmuch before the meeting,
but also that "this mention, imprecise and subject to [varying] inter213. Accord, Chalamon v. Combier, Cass. (ch. Req.), June 2, 1924, [19253 J. Soc.
154; NOumF, op. cit. supra note 65, at 184-85.
214. Cass. (ch. Req.) June 2, 1924, [1925]

J. Soc. 153.
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pretation, did not permit the shareholders effectively to exercise the
full measure of their rights ... ,"215 (Emphasis added.) On the other

hand in Barlette v. Societ6 Domaine des Quatre chemins2 16 the court,
faced with an item on the agenda almost identical in wording with
that in issue in the Combier case,217 upheld the propriety of the dismissal. But while the court granted that the item was on its face
ambiguous in that it could mean both that a director was to be dismissed or that the number of the directors was to be increased or
decreased, the fact that the directors had for some time been at odds
with each other, and three of the five directors had refused to attend
board meetings, all of which was common knowledge to the shareholders, precluded it from being misleading in this case. Thus it
appears that in construing the sufficiency of any item on the agenda
the courts' criteria is notice to shareholders, not notice to the director.
It seems clear from the above analysis of the procedural context in
which the removal power is exercised, as is the case with the extent
of the substantive power itself, that the courts have been primarily,
if not exclusively, concerned with the protection of shareholder interests. However, in the courts' treatment of these procedural problems the focus of these interests has, to some extent, shifted. Thus,
in dealing with the reach of Article 22 of the Law of July 24, 1867, the
focal point of the relevant interests was the majority of the shareholders. But once outside the ambit of that article, the courts have
widened the base of their approach. Thus, for example, in construing the legality of plural positions for directors, and in formulating
the doctrine of "incidents de stance" the resolution has been in terms
of all the shareholders, that is, the continuing welfare of the corporation itself, as well as merely the interests of the majority. And to that
extent the courts' formulation is in derogation of the often stated
sovereign power of the majority to remove without cause. Similarly,
in determining the sufficiency of any item appearing on the agenda,
the courts have explicitly recognized and sought to protect the interests of minority groups and have ensured, by indirectly opening the
courts to them, an alternate forum to promote their interests.
While the courts' concern has widened to include interests other
than those of the majority, it is beyond doubt that no weight whatever
is accorded to the director's interest in the stability of his tenure.
While this, as has been pointed out,218 is by no means compelled by
215. Ibid. See also NonmL, op. cit. supra note 65, at 185.
216. Cour d'Appel d'Alger, March 23, 1949, [1949] REC. DALLOZ (J) 606.
217. In Barlette, the item on the agenda read: "modification d apporter d la composition du conseil dadministration,sur demande d'actionnaires." The agenda item in
the Combier case was identical with that in Barlette, with the exception of the omission
of the underscored last clause.
218. See pp. 751-53 supra.
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the revelant provisions of the Commercial Code when read against
their "common law" background, it certainly is in accord with the
spirit of Article 22 of the Law of 1867 which carries forward Article
31 of the 1807 Commercial Code. Such a view is no more than a logical consequence of the contractual theory of the societ4 anonyme
that historically was the moving spirit behind French corporation law.
In short, given courts acting within rather restrictive notions of the
judicial process, criticism, if there must be such, must be leveled
at the Code itself and the basic policy decisions which it embodies
made over a century and a half ago.
V.

CONCLUSION

On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it must be concluded that
under French law the shareholders of a societ anonyme may exercise
wide powers. Without attempting to compare in detail the powers
exercised by the shartholders of a societ6 anonyme with those powers
exercised by shareholders of a business corporation in any given state
of the United States, it is perhaps sufficient to point out that both the
power to remove directors without cause and the power to allocate
profits are, to a great extent, powers not granted to shareholders in
most jurisdictions in the United States. 219 On the other hand, the
power of the shareholders of a soci&t6 anonyme to amend the articles
of incorporation seems to be quite similar in breadth to the power
exercisable by shareholders in the United States.220
However, it must also be concluded that French law bearing on
the three shareholder powers evidences a marked trend toward
narrowing their scope. Thus there is the tendency, for example, to
limit shareholder power to amend the articles of incorporation, both
by making a considerable number of the provisions of the articles
mandatory and also by allowing a probably increasing category of
interested third parties to exercise a quasi veto power over otherwise permissible amendments. Similarly, in the case of removal, there
is some evidence of a narrowing of this power by judicial scrutiny
of the procedural context in which it is exercised, allowing "legiti219. On the removal power see, e.g., Campbell v. Loew's Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134

A.2d 852 (1957); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 706(a); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 433-36
(rev. ed. 1946). But see, 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 36A (optional provision) (rev.
1959). On the power to declare dividends see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170
(1953); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 510(a); 1 MODEL Bus. Corn. ACT § 40 (rev. 1959);
BAILANTiNE, CooPoRAxoNs 550-57 (rev. ed. 1946).
220. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (1953); N.Y. Bus. Corn'. LAW § 801;
2 MODEL Bus. Corn'. AcT §§ 53, 54, 55; BAL.LA.TINE, CORnORAToNs 643-62 (rev. ed.
well be that in an economy with a chronic capital shortage, considerations of the
capacity of the shareholders to defend or protect themselves in their own contract
making capacity would not outweigh the need for corporations to plow back earnings.
1946).
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mate" employment contracts for directors, and requiring that the issue
of removal, absent special circumstances, be brought to the attention
of shareholders prior to the meeting. It is only in the case of the
power to allocate profits that this trend toward narrowing the power
exercised by the shareholders has not manifested itself. While this
may at first seem anomalous, it is perhaps in part explained by the
fact that recent litigation in this area has turned largely upon the issue
of the right of the majority to "plow back" corporate profits. In view
of the post-war shortage of capital in France and the pressing need
to rebuild industries, it is to be expected that corporate interests
would be preferred over those of a dissenting minority demanding a
dividend, and that the broad power of the majority would be affirmed.
Without necessarily wishing to criticize the results which are embodied in the law, two criticisms may legitimately, it is felt, be
leveled at the decisional method which formulated those results.
First, conspicuously absent from the decisions of the courts and the
discussions of most French commentators is any recognition of the
relevance of the practical rather than the theoretical distribution of
power between the shareholders on one hand and various layers of
the corporate administration on the other. To give an obvious example, the supposed power of the shareholders to allocate profits may
be largely mythical in the case of a publicly held corporation with a
broad base of shareholders and consequently a self-perpetuating
board of directors. Yet neither the Cour d'Appel nor the Cour de
Cassation in the Schumann case so much as alluded to this factor in

their interpretation of the relevant law; and the statutory law that bore
on this issue was passed by the legislature long before there was any
recognition of the range problems that may be lumped under the
heading of "corporate democracy." Thus, it seems that one extremely
important component of this particular problem is, if not entirely
ignored, at least not being articulatedY2'
Second, similarly absent from the decisions and the commentaries
is any recognition of the fact that the resolution of corporate problems
must necessarily involve an accommodation of conflicting interests;
and that changing social and economic conditions require that the
accommodations that have been formulated in the past be reviewed
in the light of contemporary insights. It is of course true that in a
civil law jurisdiction, with its almost exclusive reliance on statutory
law, the prime responsibility for this process of accommodation and
revision is with the legislature. But it is also true that no codification
221. This is not to say, however, that the result in Schumann was wrong. It may
well be that in an economy with a chronic capital shortage, considerations of the
capacity of the shartholders to defend or protect themselves in their own contract
making capacity would not outweigh the need for corporations to plow back earnings.
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can be so complete in its conception as to be self-sufficient in its
application.22 No matter how thoroughly drafted, lacunae become apparent and the courts, therefore, are forced to "legislate interstitially,"
whether it is called legislation or the application of the "spirit" of the
codes. But if this process consists of the blind application of a conceptual scheme to a legal issue, the solutions which the courts reach
may well be incapable of resolving the social and economic forces
that gave rise to the problems in the first place. If, on the other hand,
as is more likely, the conceptual scheme is devised to harmonize a
pragmatic solution with the Codes in order to avoid being charged
with usurping legislative power, something in the process is inevitably
lost: the decisional process is being obscured behind uninformative
and unreasoned opinions, as a result of which the rationality and predictability of the law is greatly diminished.
But it seems clear that the courts, once outside the mandatory and
sometimes antiquated resolutions which the statutory law embodies,
have sub silentio resorted to a decisional process involving a weighing
of relevant interests. This seems particularly apparent in the areas of
the removal power and the power to allocate profits, where the law
has been to a large extent decisional. However, the greatest stumbling block to a truly effective exercise of such a mode of decision is
the almost alarming unwillingness of the courts or the commentators
to appreciate the fact that just such a process is being used. Thus, an
articulate body of law relating to shareholder powers must await both
a body of statutory law that recognizes to a greater extent the need
for and power of the courts to exercise quasi-legislative functions, and
the freedom of informed analysis of that law from its conceptual
prejudices.
222.

AmsToTLE,

ETmcs BK. 5, ch. 10 f. 1137(b), lines 12-28.

